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1783 
THE UNWILLING DONOR 
Jennifer Mueller* 
Abstract: For nearly forty years, the Supreme Court has evaluated campaign finance 
restrictions by weighing the First Amendment burden they place on a donor eager to engage 
the political process against the government’s interest in avoiding corruption of that process. 
Most recently, in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court struck down aggregate contribution limits, 
allowing donors to give—and candidates and parties to solicit—millions of dollars directly to 
candidates, parties, and political action committees. Yet what should have been a significant 
victory for big donors was greeted with dismay by many of the same. 
There is growing evidence that the story we have been telling ourselves about political 
money is, at best, incomplete, and that many donors give only reluctantly, out of fear of 
political repercussions. This Article examines the problem of the unwilling donor and argues 
for the first time that it has significant implications for campaign finance doctrine. Flipping 
the narrative allows a fresh view of key concepts, including the need for systemic campaign 
finance regulations, the Court’s current emphasis on quid pro quo corruption, and the First 
Amendment interests of campaign donors. Previous scholarship has overlooked the existence 
and constitutional import of this alternative, “extortionate,” framework. 
The Unwilling Donor steps into this critical gap. The Article first provides an overview of 
the Supreme Court’s past campaign finance jurisprudence, including McCutcheon, almost all 
of which is premised on the notion of a willing donor. It then surveys empirical studies and 
historical data to demonstrate that the unwilling donor, while perhaps not a sympathetic 
character, is a very real one. The final Part of the Article contemplates the legal significance 
of the unwilling donor problem, concluding that it is relevant to the continued vitality of 
campaign finance efforts, to the Court’s analysis of campaign finance reform restrictions, and 
to future litigation strategies in this area. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The sweetest words in the English language are: ‘I’m maxed 
out.’”1 
 
Big political donors—so-called “fat cats,”2 “deep pockets,”3 or 
“whales”4—hardly cut sympathetic figures. Even before Citizens United 
v. FEC
5
 changed the rules for corporate and union political spending, 
rich donors had free rein to spend as much money as they wished to 
influence federal elections so long as their expenditures were neither 
requested by nor coordinated with an elected official, political party 
member, or candidate.
6
 Some have seized that opportunity, particularly 
in recent years.
7
 
                                                     
1. Observation made to author in 2002 by a former colleague and big donor. 
2. Fat Cat, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 828 (2002). 
3. Peter Olsen-Phillips & Kathy Kiely, Keystone XL: Senate Caught Between Big Donors, 
SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Nov. 18, 2014, 11:04 AM), 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/11/18/keystone-xl-senate-caught-between-big-donors/. 
4. Joel Connelly, ‘Big Money’: How American Politics Became a Game Run by and for 
Billionaires, SEATTLEPI: STRANGE BEDFELLOWS (June 9, 2014, 3:37 PM), 
http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/2014/06/09/big-money-how-american-politics-became-a-
game-run-by-and-for-billionaires/.  
5. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
6. Id. Individuals have always been free to spend independently to support candidates through 
outside spending not coordinated with a candidate or campaign. Id. at 355. Citizens United removed 
limits on corporation and union independent expenditures and electioneering communications. Id. at 
340–65.  
7. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Koch Brothers’ Budget of $889 Million for 2016 Is on Par with 
Both Parties’ Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
01/27/us/politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html?_r=1; Peter Olsen-
Phillips, Revenge of the Democrats: Wealthy Liberals Top List of Super PAC Donors in 2014, 
SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2014, 2:46 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog 
/2014/10/24/revenge-of-the-democrats/; 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, 
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Individual donors are far more restricted if they want to make “hard 
money” contributions, however. “Hard” dollars are the only funds that a 
federal candidate can legally solicit and the only funds that can flow 
directly into campaign committees, political parties, and traditional 
political action committees (PACs).
8
 Until April 2014, a large donor 
who wished to give directly to his favorite candidate or political party 
was constrained by two limits.
9
 The first was a “base limit” that capped 
the amount that an individual could give to any individual candidate, 
national party committee, state party committee, or PAC.
10
 For example, 
                                                     
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp= 
D&type=V&superonly=N (last visited July 19, 2015) (noting that the top 100 individual donors, 
who donated two-thirds of the total amount given to SuperPACS, donated amounts from $885,000 
to $92.7 million). 
8. 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e)(1) (2012). An individual’s contributions to PACs are limited to $5000 
per PAC per year. Id. § 30116(a)(1)(C). “SuperPACs,” technically known as independent 
expenditure committees, are not subject to these limits but can make neither direct contributions nor 
any expenditure that is solicited by or coordinated with a candidate, party, or campaign. Id. § 30101 
(17); 11 C.F.R. § 100.16 (2014). Solicitations for and contributions of unrestricted “soft money,” 
which historically supported party activities other than direct campaigning, have been banned since 
the 2002 passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). 52 U.S.C. § 30125(a). 
Corporations and unions cannot make direct, “hard money,” contributions, although they may form 
PACs to which their employees or members can contribute. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 
116–17 (2003) (tracing the history of these bans). 
9. The Biennial Contribution Limit, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/ 
pages/brochures/biennial.shtml (last visited July 19, 2015). Throughout this Article, I will refer to 
the donor as a male. This reflects the reality that less than a third of political donors are women. See 
Donor Demographics, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/ 
donordemographics.php?cycle=2014&filter=G (last visited July 19, 2015) (analyzing the gender 
disparity of donors for the 2013–2014 campaign cycle). Of the top 100 political donors in 2012, 
only eleven were women, down from twenty-one in 1990. See id.; Sarah Bryner & Doug Weber, 
Sex, Money & Politics: A Center for Responsive Politics Report on Women as Donors and 
Candidates, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
news/reports/gender.php (noting that the percentage of women donors increased only three percent 
over nearly a quarter century); Anna Palmer & Tarini Parti, Money Gap: Why Don’t Women Give?, 
POLITICO (July 22, 2014, 5:02 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/women-political-
donations-109206.html (reporting that the top ten male donors had given over six times more than 
the top ten female donors at that point in the election cycle). Because I value not only verisimilitude, 
but also aspiration and narrative clarity, I will generally refer to elected officials or candidates as 
female. 
10. In 2013–2014, the maximum “base level” donation for an individual was $2600 to a candidate 
per election (or $5200 assuming a primary and general election), $32,400 to a national party 
committee per year, $10,000 to a state party committee per year, and $5000 to a PAC per year. 
Contribution Limits 2013–14, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/ 
pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). Many of these limits are indexed 
for inflation. For the 2015–2016 election cycle, the indexed limits increased to $2700 to a candidate 
per election and $33,400 to a national party committee per year. Price Index Adjustments for 
Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobby Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 80 Fed. Reg. 
5750 (Feb. 3, 2015). A donation directed or earmarked for a candidate through another committee is 
treated as a direct donation to the candidate. 11 C.F.R. § 110.6. Additionally, in its 2015 
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in the 2013–2014 election cycle, a donor could write a check (or a series 
of checks) to then-House Speaker John Boehner for no more than a total 
of $5200, and to the Republican National Committee for no more than a 
total of $64,800.
11
 The second limit was the “aggregate limit,” which 
capped the total amount a donor could directly contribute to all 
recipients per two-year cycle.
12
 For 2013–2014, a donor “maxed out” 
once he gave an aggregate of $48,600 to candidates and $74,600 to 
parties and other political committees, for a grand total of $123,200.
13
 In 
early 2014, a donor from Georgia, a state that holds fourteen seats in the 
House of Representatives, would have faced a choice if he wished to 
contribute to his state’s Democratic slate of congressional candidates: 
pick nine candidates to support with the maximum $5200 contribution, 
or give just $3471 to each of the fourteen candidates. 
That changed in April 2014, when the Supreme Court struck down the 
aggregate limits in McCutcheon v. FEC.
14
 Individual donors can now 
contribute up to the base limit to every candidate, national and state 
committee, and PAC. The day after McCutcheon, if our hypothetical 
donor wished to “max out” to each candidate and party committee, he 
could have directly contributed more than $3.6 million per election cycle 
per party—a figure that excludes contributions to PACs, which number 
in the thousands.
15
 According to a plurality of Justices on the Supreme 
                                                     
appropriations act, Congress allowed national, senatorial, and congressional party committees to 
create separate committee accounts and set dramatically higher contribution limits for these 
committees. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-
235, div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. 2130, 2772–73 (2014) (to be codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30116). In the 
2015–2016 cycle, national, senatorial, and congressional party committees can solicit up to 
$100,200 for each of three new accounts—conventions, election recounts and legal proceedings, 
and national party headquarters buildings—in addition to their main account. Id.; see also FEC, 
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR 2015–2016 FEDERAL ELECTIONS, n.2, available at 
http://www.fec.gov/info/contriblimitschart1516.pdf. Only the national party committees can create 
accounts for presidential conventions. div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. at 2772–73. In total, a donor in the 
2015–2016 cycle can now contribute (and be asked to contribute) up to $334,000 to a national party 
and $233,800 to each of a party’s senate and congressional campaign committees, or $801,000 per 
party; some have shown a willingness to do so. See, e.g., Rebecca Ballhaus, Billionaire Ken Griffin 
Is First to Max-Out on New Party Donation Limits, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Feb. 23, 2015, 2:15 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/02/23/billionaire-ken-griffin-is-first-to-max-out-on-new-
party-donation-limits/ (highlighting how just two months after Congress passed the appropriations 
bill, an individual donor maxed out at the new, inflated levels). 
11. See Contribution Limits 2013–14, supra note 10.  
12. 52 U.S.C. § 30116. 
13. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
14. Id. 
15. The $3.6 million figure represented what was, at the time McCutcheon was decided, the 
maximum that an individual donor could give if he were to support to the maximum allowable 
amount a candidate in every House and Senate race, three national party committees, and fifty state 
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Court, abolishing aggregate limits advances wealthy donors’ First 
Amendment rights, allowing them to fully “participat[e] in an electoral 
debate that we have recognized is ‘integral to the operation of the system 
of government established by our Constitution.’”16 This line of reasoning 
follows a narrative that has informed every campaign finance case since 
Buckley v. Valeo
17
 in 1976, a narrative in which wealthy special interests 
clamor to influence the political process. The task then for courts is to 
weigh these donors’ First Amendment interests in speech and 
association against the risk that their participation might corrupt, or 
appear to corrupt, candidates and elected officials.
18
 
This Article argues that this narrative is, at best, incomplete, and that 
this deficiency has significant and underappreciated doctrinal 
consequences. Evidence of this oversight comes in part from donors 
themselves. Although on its face the McCutcheon ruling marked a great 
victory for the aforementioned “fat cats,” it was greeted with dismay by 
many in the business and lobbying communities—the very wealthy 
donors whose rights a plurality of the Court vigorously defended. “I’m 
                                                     
parties. See id. at 1473 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (highlighting how a hypothetical “Rich Donor” could 
funnel the entire $3.6 million to one candidate via PACs). In December 2014, Congress increased 
both the number of national party accounts and also raised the cap for contributions to those 
accounts to $100,200 per account annually. See div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. at 2772–73. Thus, for the 
2015–2016 election cycle the maximum allowable individual contribution—making the same 
assumptions—would rise from $3.6 million to $5.1 million. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1485 
app. B (describing how Justice Breyer came to the original $3.6 million figure); Price Index 
Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobby Bundling Disclosure 
Threshold, 80 Fed. Reg. 5750. While this figure assumes maximum giving, it also assumes that the 
contributor would support only one candidate in each primary and one party’s committees; the 
Court most likely envisioned a straight-party ticket. See Justin Levitt, Why McCutcheon Is Bad 
News for Millionaires, POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.politico.com/ 
magazine/story/2014/04/mccutcheon-supreme-court-millionaires-105307.html#.VCB_5OcdKC8. 
As Donald Trump colorfully reminded voters during his run for the Republican presidential 
nomination in 2015, however, some donors will give significant amounts to both parties. See Will 
Cabaniss, Donald Trump’s Campaign Contributions to Democrats and Republicans, PUNDITFACT 
(July 9, 2015, 6:29 PM), http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/jul/09/ben-
ferguson/donald-trumps-campaign-contributions-democrats-and/. PACs, which are not considered 
in the $3.6 (now $5.1) million calculation, currently number over 7300, including 532 “Leadership 
PACs” affiliated with federal candidates but independent of their campaigns. See Press Release, 
FEC, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the 2011–2012 Election Cycle (2014), 
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/pdf/20130419release.pdf.  
16. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)). 
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
18. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444, 1448; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 
(2010); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 478 (2007); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 
155 (2003); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 
U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661 (1990); 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15. 
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horrified, planning to de-list my phone number and destroy my email 
address,” said one donor who had previously given at the aggregate 
limits.
19
 “I’m poor again as a result,” announced a top lobbyist who had 
also maxed out in previous election cycles.
20
 “We believe that the 
decision is based on wishful thinking,” wrote the American Sustainable 
Business Council on behalf of its more than 200,000 members.
21
 
From the reactions, it seems that McCutcheon may have been the least 
business-friendly Supreme Court decision of the term.
22
 It also may have 
been one of the most troubling First Amendment decisions, although not 
for the reasons—or not only for the reasons—that commentators have 
already noted. The opinion has been critiqued for narrowing the grounds 
on which Congress can enact campaign finance contribution restrictions 
to the risk of actual or apparent “quid pro quo” corruption.23 Relatedly, 
some have suggested that because quid pro quo transactions between 
contributors and candidates are already prohibited by a web of federal 
and state criminal laws, the Court’s holding presages a not-so-distant 
day when the entirety of the federal campaign finance framework will be 
                                                     
19. Anna Palmer & Tarini Parti, Big Donors Fear Shakedown, POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2014, 7:36 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/supreme-court-campaign-finance-donations-mccutcheon-
105320.html#ixzz3Bz0TAkeq. 
20. Id. 
21. Business Leaders Critical of McCutcheon v. FEC Campaign Finance Decision, AM. 
SUSTAINABLE BUS. COUNCIL (Apr. 3, 2014), http://asbcouncil.org/news/press-release/business-
leaders-critical-mccutcheon-v-fec-campaign-finance-decision#.U8W2aPldWSp [hereinafter ASB 
Business Leaders Critical]; see also Tory Newmyer, Are Lobbyists the Biggest Losers Post-
McCutcheon?, FORTUNE (Apr. 2, 2014, 6:36 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/04/02/are-lobbyists-the-
biggest-losers-post-mccutcheon/ (describing lobbyists as anxious about having to hand over more 
money to political campaigns). 
22. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947 
(2008) (describing the Supreme Court, as of 2008, as generally favoring business over interests of 
others, such as consumers and employers, to an extent not seen since the 1930s); Lee Epstein, 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 1431 (2013) (determining, based on Supreme Court opinions since 1946, that five of the ten 
Justices most favorable to business are currently on the Supreme Court). 
23. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., An Indecent Burial, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/an-indecent-burial.html; Richard A. Posner, Does 
Chief Justice John Roberts Show a Certain Casualness About the Truth?, SLATE (June 25, 2014, 
1:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2014/ 
scotus_roundup/scotus_end_of_term_is_roberts_casual_about_the_truth_in_the_campaign_finance.
html; Zephyr Teachout, What John Roberts Doesn’t Get About Corruption, POLITICO (Apr. 14, 
2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/04/what-john-roberts-doesnt-get-about-
corruption-105683.html#.VBjOH_ldV8E. In theory, the “circumvention rationale”—which allows 
Congress to enact supplemental limitations designed to prevent an end-run around core campaign 
finance restrictions—still survives, but after McCutcheon it is not clear what circumvention-
prevention provisions would pass constitutional muster. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1454–56; id. 
at 1473–77 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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found redundant and not sufficiently compelling to justify the First 
Amendment burden it places on campaign contributors.
24
 
Ignored in these discussions are the First Amendment interests of the 
donor who does not want to give, or does not want to give at the 
requested levels, but feels he has no choice. This is not the donor who 
gives willingly but with a possibly mixed motive (i.e., support and 
access), but one who would choose not to become involved in political 
discussions at all, or to the amount asked, yet believes a candidate’s 
potential to harm his business or financial interests is such that he cannot 
risk turning down a direct request for support. I call him the unwilling 
donor.
25
 There is abundant evidence such donors exist, and they are 
becoming more vocal. A former president of Shell Oil USA recently 
called his prior campaign contributions extortion payments on national 
television.
26
 In the fall of 2013, the book Extortion compared elected 
officials to mafia dons.
27
 
Notwithstanding these increasingly assertive (and possibly 
overwrought) reports in the press, the problem of the unwilling donor 
has gone largely unremarked by election law and First Amendment 
scholars. This is particularly curious given the development of related 
concepts in public choice scholarship.
28
 For decades, social scientists 
promoted “rent-seeking” as an economic theory of political exchange 
that explains socially inefficient public laws and regulations by reference 
to private gains favoring the rent seeker, or briber—a model that closely 
tracks the classic campaign finance narrative described above.
29
 
                                                     
24. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Die Another Day: The Supreme Court Takes a Big Step Closer to 
Gutting the Last Bits of Campaign Finance Reform, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014, 1:13 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/04/the_subtle_awfulness_of_t
he_mccutcheon_v_fec_campaign_finance_decision_the.html (arguing the Chief Justice’s opinion 
opens the door to attack for what remains of campaign finance law). 
25. I have chosen “unwilling” because it offers the cleanest parallel to “willing,” although its 
meaning is also captured by other adjectives such as “reluctant” or “grudging”; the reader may find 
one of these alternatives more appealing (or appropriately nuanced), but it does not change the 
analysis. 
26. David Fitzpatrick & Drew Griffin, Ex-Shell Oil President: ‘I Felt Extorted,’ CNN (Jan. 23, 
2014, 8:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/political-fundraising-griffin/ (quoting 
John Hofmeister as saying: “Every time I wrote a check I felt that it was a form of extortion, the 
price of entry, because of the reception that you got when you contributed versus the reception when 
you did not contribute”).  
27. PETER SCHWEIZER, EXTORTION 19–20, 39–40, 101–02 (2013). 
28. See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 
(1974) (outlining public choice theory); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
29. See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. 
REV. 291 (1974) (coining the term “rent-seeking” as an explanation of the behaviors of actors in 
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Following on this work, in 1997 economist and law professor Fred 
McChesney demonstrated that political giving that could not be 
rationalized through a “rent seeking” cost-benefit analysis could be 
explained by looking instead to “rent extraction,” or private gain by the 
public official (the rent extractor, or extorter).
30
 However, few scholars 
have examined whether a similar shift of viewpoint might offer new 
insights in the campaign finance context.
31
 
This Article ventures into this surprisingly under-theorized area to 
argue that the problem of the unwilling donor is a foundational one for 
campaign finance doctrine, one that goes far deeper than notions of 
corruption, quid pro quo or otherwise. An individual’s interest in freely 
choosing not to speak or to associate is surely no less important than his 
right to engage in these activities free of undue government interference, 
and both are equally magnified when that speech cuts to the heart of the 
political dialogue that is meant to undergird our democracy. Likewise, 
the government has an interest in protecting the rights of both the willing 
and unwilling donor that extends beyond concerns about corruption or 
                                                     
markets with government regulations who compete for “rents,” or profits to be made as a result of 
government allocation). As used in public choice literature, “rent seeking” is a form of socially 
inefficient profit seeking through which one seeks advantage through political allocation rather than 
the markets; money received in excess of opportunity costs are called “rents.” See James M. 
Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in 40 YEARS OF RESEARCH ON RENT SEEKING 1: 
THEORY OF RENT SEEKING 55, 55–60 (Roger D. Congleton et al. eds., 2008). 
30. See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING 2–3 (1997) (explaining the system of 
payments made to politicians not as payments for favors or “rent seeking,” but rather as a system of 
political extortion to avoid disfavor and terming it “rent extraction” or “wealth extraction”); see also 
Douglas Ginsburg, A New Economic Theory of Regulation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1771 (1999) (placing 
McChesney in George Stigler’s “economic theory of regulation school”). McChesney further argues 
that the only way to solve the problem of rent extraction is to reduce the size of the federal 
government, thereby limiting the coercive potential of “asks.” MCCHESNEY, supra, at 170. For 
reasons beyond the scope of this Article, I find this conclusion problematic, and I am not persuaded 
that it would address the problem of the unwilling donor.  
31. The most notable works of legal scholarship in this area are Robert H. Sitkoff’s 2002 Article 
Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1103 (2002), and Richard L. Hasen’s 2012 Article Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the 
Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012). Similarly, Heather K. Gerken and Alex Tausanovitch 
recently observed that lobbying—which is implicated in any discussion of rent-seeking or rent-
extracting—is the “red-headed stepchild” in election law. Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch, 
A Public Finance Model for Lobbying: Lobbying, Campaign Finance, and the Privatization of 
Democracy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 75, 75 (2014). While the oversight is being remedied—Gerken and 
Tausanovitch’s observation was made in a 2014 volume of the Election Law Journal that was titled 
Under the Influence? Lobbying and Campaign Finance—as recently as 2008 scholars were 
continuing to overlook the relationship between lobbying and campaign finance. See Richard 
Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
105, 106 (2008) (reporting that this “[a]rticle constitutes a first effort at probing the relationship 
between lobbying and campaign finance”). 
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its appearance. This Article argues that when evaluating campaign 
finance restrictions, it is not enough for courts to balance the risks of 
impeding a contributor’s First Amendment rights against the risks of 
corruption, as they currently do. They should also balance the risk of 
impeding a willing donor’s rights of speech and association against the 
risk that, in the absence of effective campaign finance legislation, an 
unwilling donor will be induced to speak or associate in a way that does 
not reflect his true beliefs. Viewed thus, the unwilling donor may be a 
missing key in what often seems to be the riddle of campaign finance 
reform. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes how the Supreme 
Court has analyzed restrictions on campaign contributions since passage 
of the amended Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in 1974,
32
 with 
particular focus on Buckley, which set out the analytical framework, and 
McCutcheon, which altered the framework in a way that more starkly 
exposes the problem of the unwilling donor. Part II summarizes 
evidence that the unwilling donor exists and places the issue in historical 
context. Part III considers the implications of the unwilling donor for 
campaign finance doctrine. It first contemplates and rejects the 
possibility that an individual unwilling donor could and would vindicate 
his own interests, thereby affirming both the need for campaign finance 
regulation and the fact that these laws must be understood as a structural, 
prophylactic reform. It then proposes doctrinal adjustments to the 
Supreme Court’s campaign finance framework that might achieve a 
balance between the willing and unwilling donor and contemplates how 
acknowledgment of the unwilling donor might have changed the 
plurality’s analysis in McCutcheon. 
I. CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE COURTS 
The legal framework for analyzing the constitutionality of campaign 
finance restrictions dates back four decades to the passage of FECA and 
its partial dismantling by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo. At the 
core of FECA and its successor statute, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 (BCRA),
33
 are rules governing “hard money,” which are the 
only funds that can be contributed directly to a federal candidate, party, 
                                                     
32. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 608 (2012) and 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012)). 
33. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 607, 36 U.S.C. §§ 510–511 (2012), 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2012), and in scattered sections of 
2 U.S.C. and 52 U.S.C.). 
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or political committee and, crucially, the only funds that can be solicited 
by candidates or party officials.
34
 Until challenged in McCutcheon, the 
framework that the Court set out in Buckley governed such campaign 
contributions. This section outlines the history of campaign finance laws 
since the passage of FECA, with a particular focus on the Court’s 
treatment of these contributions. 
In the discussion that follows, it is helpful to observe the assumptions 
and interpretations that inform campaign finance jurisprudence; they 
both highlight shifts over time in the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
campaign contributions and suggest how the unwilling donor might 
affect its analysis in the future. The first is the nature of the rights 
impinged. In the context of campaign finance, the Court has adopted the 
view that spending money has both an expressive and associative 
element (although its understanding of this burden has changed over the 
decades), and thus limits on campaign contributions trigger 
constitutional scrutiny under the First Amendment.
35
 The second is the 
focus of the First Amendment’s protections. Earlier campaign finance 
cases suggested that the primacy of the First Amendment is rooted in the 
important role it plays in safeguarding the process through which a 
nation fosters an informed and participatory electorate, cutting to the 
core of the democratic process.
36
 More recent opinions, by contrast, have 
highlighted the burden campaign finance restrictions place on an 
individual donor’s autonomous First Amendment rights.37 The third is 
                                                     
34. Id.; see also supra note 8. “Hard money” is a holdover term from the pre-BCRA era when it 
was used to distinguish between party contributions subject to source and use restrictions and those 
that could be used for “party building” activities independent of a campaign. See McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122–26 (2003). 
35. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“Some forms of communication made possible 
by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and 
some involve a combination of the two.”). Contra Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 
398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining an opposing view of political campaign money, 
neatly summarized as “[m]oney is property; it is not speech” and therefore unprotected by the First 
Amendment). 
36. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14–15. 
37. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (plurality opinion); 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); FEC v. Wis. 
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); see also ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED 10–43 (2014) 
(tracing development of the modern understanding of the First Amendment from the Founding 
Fathers to present day and positing that the “First Amendment can remain the guardian of our 
democracy only so long as we interpret its requirements to promote the value of self-
determination”); Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the 
Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 806 (2014) (contrasting approaches that 
focus on the “organization, structure, and exercise of actual political power” and those that focus on 
“protecting and developing the dignity, or the autonomy, or the ‘personhood’ of the individual”); 
Mark D. Rosen, The Structural Constitutional Principle of Republican Legitimacy, 54 WM. & 
 
12 - Mueller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:08 PM 
2015] THE UNWILLING DONOR 1793 
 
the government’s interest in regulating campaign contributions. Over the 
last four decades, both advocates and the Supreme Court have focused 
on the government’s interest in reducing the risk that donors or special 
interests pose to the political process; in other words, corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.
38
 Here too the shift in emphasis between 
individual and systemic harms is evident. As the Court has moved away 
from a structural understanding of the First Amendment rights of speech 
and association, it has struggled with the notion of corruption as a 
diffuse, non-personalized concept.
39
 Partially as a result, today campaign 
finance outcomes turn on scope at least as much as the level of scrutiny. 
Whereas once the Court took a more expansive view of the corruption 
risk that campaign finance restrictions could constitutionally target, in its 
current narrow iteration it looks like something “akin to bribery,” or the 
direct exchange of dollars for an identifiable political favor.
40
 
A. FECA and Buckley 
At the time that Buckley was decided, the problem with money in 
politics did not seem to be the unwilling donor so much as the all-too-
willing donor. FECA was first passed in 1971, but, as post-Watergate 
hearings revealed, during the 1972 elections it was more honored in the 
breach.
41
 Congressional and media investigations exposed a series of 
campaign violations in which business interests funneled money to 
elected officials, including (especially) President Nixon, in order to 
receive favorable treatment from the government.
42
 In one series of 
transactions, the dairy industry sought to increase price supports—
subsidies underwritten by U.S. taxpayers to the tune of $100 million—in 
return for a political donation of $2 million, which it channeled through 
                                                     
MARY L. REV. 371 (2012). 
38. The Court has also upheld restrictions based on the ancillary justification that in its absence 
the statutory scheme could be circumvented. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38. But see supra note 
23. 
39. See, e.g., Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 388; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; see also Rosen, supra note 37, 
at 441–52 (arguing that “Republican Legitimacy,” which elevates structural constitutional 
principles, provides a superior framework for analyzing campaign finance restrictions than the 
corruption balancing test). 
40. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Hasen, supra note 24; 
Teachout, supra note 23. 
41. S. REP. NO. 93-981, at 579–867 (1974) (describing the exchange of campaign contributions 
for political and regulatory favors to industry). 
42. See id.; Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 836–40 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (detailing the quick increase in spending in the 1972 election propelled by the 
Nixon campaign’s shady and often illegal methods of raising corporate campaign money). 
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industry executives and hundreds of PACs.
43
 Once President Nixon 
confirmed that the contributions had been made, he overruled his 
Secretary of Agriculture to increase the dairy price supports.
44
 
In response, Congress enacted a more robust version of FECA in 
1974.
45
 The revised law, which was promptly challenged in Buckley, 
limited the amount that individuals could contribute as well as the 
amount that campaigns could spend, and it required disclosure of both.
46
 
Both restrictions were initially upheld by the circuit court, but on appeal 
the Supreme Court allowed only the contribution limits to stand.
47
 The 
Court’s per curiam analysis started with the proposition that restrictions 
on campaign contributions and expenditures touch on the core First 
Amendment rights of “political association” and “political expression,” 
and that these rights protect more than individual, autonomous 
interests.
48
 The Court observed from the outset: 
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of 
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of 
                                                     
43. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Op-Ed., Without Limits, Lobbyists Can Be Very Powerful, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/06/why-limit-political-
donations/without-limits-lobbyists-can-be-very-powerful. John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s counsel, 
quipped, “[b]etter go get a glass of milk. Drink it while it’s cheap.” Transcript, Meeting Among 
President Richard M. Nixon, John B. Connally, John D. Ehrlichman, Clifford M. Hardin, John 
Whitaker, George P. Shultz, J. Phil Campbell, Donald B. Rice on March 23, 1971 from 5:05 to 5:38 
P.M. in the Oval Office, at 25, available at http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/ 
watergate/trial/connally_exhibit_1.pdf. It is perhaps no coincidence that around the same era 
economists first identified the problem of rent-seeking in public choice theory. See supra note 29. 
44. See S. REP. NO. 93-981 (detailing the methods and schemes used to exchange campaign 
contributions for price supports in the milk industry); see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Justices 
Should Think of Quarter Pounders in Latest Money in Politics Case, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. 
BLOG (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/justices-should-think-quarter-pounders-
latest-money-politics-case (describing how in 1972 Nixon’s price commission allowed McDonald’s, 
and McDonald’s alone, to raise its burger prices after the CEO of McDonald’s donated $250,000 to 
Nixon’s reelection campaign). 
45. See David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line Between Candidate 
Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. & POL. 33, 39 (1998). (“By consensus, the 
impetus for passage of the 1974 amendments was the corruption surrounding the fundraising and 
campaign spending in the 1972 presidential election.”).  
46. See Buckley, 519 F.2d at 851–69. 
47. Id. at 841 (noting that while our “nation . . . respects the drive of private profit and the pursuit 
of gain, [it] does not exalt wealth thereby achieved to undue preference in fundamental rights” and 
finding that “statute taken as a whole affirmatively enhances First Amendment values”); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976). 
48. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14–23. Although the Constitution does not explicitly protect the right of 
association, the Supreme Court has found it “beyond debate that freedom to engage in association 
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–66 (1958). 
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government established by our Constitution. The First 
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political 
expression in order to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas 
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people. . . . This no more than reflects our profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. In a republic where the 
people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make 
informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for 
the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the 
course that we follow as a nation.
49
 
The Court thus subjected the expenditure and contribution caps to a 
form of “exacting scrutiny” and considered whether the government had 
a compelling interest in enacting the restrictions.
50
 It found such 
justification in the government’s interest in the “prevention of corruption 
and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined 
coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates’ 
positions and on their actions if elected to office.”51 In the Court’s view, 
the threat of corruption came from special interests seeking to use the 
political process to create personal gains at the public’s expense, as with 
the dairy cooperative example above.
52
 In this, it agreed with the lower 
court.
53
 
Unlike the circuit court, however, the Supreme Court found that the 
government’s anti-corruption interest only justified FECA’s caps on 
contributions.
54
 Money spent directly on campaign expenses such as 
advertisements could not be limited, in the Court’s view, because these 
funds cut too close to the expressive interests the First Amendment was 
designed to protect.
55
 The Court was less troubled by the First 
Amendment burden posed by contribution caps, which it understood to 
                                                     
49. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14–15 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  
50. Id. at 14–23. The Court has subsequently applied strict scrutiny to expenditure caps, but it has 
declined to extend this analysis to contribution limits. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. 
Ct. 1434, 1444–46 (2014) (plurality opinion); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 
U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985). 
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. 
52. Id. at 32; see also supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 32 n.28. 
54. Id. at 27–29. 
55. The Court reached this conclusion through an analytical two-step. Because expenditures 
related most directly to the communication of ideas, it reasoned, only expenditures relating to 
express support for or opposition to a candidate could be regulated—and once one made that 
limitation, the potential for circumvention was so significant that any limit was unlikely to address 
corruption. Id. at 14–22, 39–50.  
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fall more heavily on association rights than speech rights.
56
 In the 
political marketplace of ideas, the act of writing a check does not add 
new arguments, rebut existing beliefs, or offer much by way of 
persuasion. Because any “expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, 
symbolic act of contributing,” the Supreme Court reasoned, “[t]he 
quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase 
perceptibly with the size of his contribution.”57 
The Court supported its decision to let the contribution caps stand 
with a few additional observations. First, FECA’s contribution limits 
were not so severe as to “prevent[] candidates and political committees 
from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”58 
Second, a political contributor who faced the cap had other options for 
expression and association. He remained “free to become a member of 
any political association and to assist personally in the association’s 
efforts on behalf of candidates.”59 He also remained free to make 
independent expenditures by, for example, running advertisements in 
support of a candidate that were neither coordinated with nor requested 
by the candidate (a practice that the Buckley Court regarded as providing 
only limited benefit to the candidate, who could not control the 
message).
60
 Finally, in regards to the risk of corruption, the contribution 
caps were “closely drawn” in that they were targeted to the moment 
where money changed hands, with the intent of limiting the risk of a 
“quid” in search of a “quo.”61 Of note, the Court rejected the suggestion 
                                                     
56. Id. at 15–16. 
57. Id. at 21 (“At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of 
the contributor’s support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give 
to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political 
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but 
does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While 
contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present 
views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by 
someone other than the contributor.” (footnotes and citations omitted)). 
58. Id.; cf. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 241 (2006) (finding Vermont state contribution limits 
were too severe). 
59. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22. 
60. Id. at 45–46. 
61. Id. at 1, 28–29 (“The Act’s $1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of 
large campaign contributions—the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and 
potential for corruption have been identified—while leaving persons free to engage in independent 
political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a 
limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial 
resources. Significantly, the Act’s contribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any 
material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues 
by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties.” 
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that bribery statutes, which target individual acts of corruption, offered a 
preferable, less restrictive means to fight corruption.
62
 FECA’s 
structural, prophylactic approach to reducing the risk of corruption or its 
appearance was both constitutional and within Congress’s mandate. 
The Buckley Court also upheld the aggregate caps, or limits on the 
total amount that one could directly contribute in an election cycle.
63
 
Although neither party had specifically challenged the aggregate caps, in 
its brief discussion of the issue the Court offered two reasons for finding 
them valid. First, given that contributions were not expressive beyond 
the act of giving, the aggregate caps did not limit any core First 
Amendment interest.
64
 If he wished, a donor could still associate with 
every candidate through a contribution of a nominal amount.
65
 Second, 
in the absence of aggregate limits the Court thought it likely that the 
base contribution caps would be circumvented by entrepreneurial 
donors, a phenomenon that had occurred at a staggering scale during the 
1972 election.
66
 Aggregate caps anticipated some of the more obvious 
end runs that overly eager donors might take and shored up the statutory 
scheme. 
Buckley thus replaced FECA’s comprehensive set of restrictions with 
a more piecemeal approach that attempted to balance perceived First 
Amendment burdens against the risk of corruption of the political 
process. Its analysis drew on the character of the speech protected, the 
distinctions between association and speech rights, and the government’s 
interest in reducing corruption through structural reform. As described 
below, the McCutcheon plurality would shift this analysis in profound 
ways, but, perhaps ironically, in doing so it would rely on the same 
                                                     
(citations and footnotes omitted)). 
62. Id. at 28 (noting that such laws “deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those 
with money to influence governmental action”). 
63. Id. at 38 (“The overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of 
candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial 
support. But this quite modest restraint upon protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of 
the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of 
money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political 
committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political 
party.”). 
64. Id. at 36–37. 
65. Id. at 38. 
66. Id. For example, “American Milk Producers, Inc. avoided being disclosed as providing a $2 
million contribution to the Nixon campaign by dividing the funds into $2,500 contributions to 
hundreds of political committees, with no more than $2,500 going to any single committee.” Trevor 
Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections & How 2012 
Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 414 (2013). 
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flawed point of departure that had animated the Buckley majority: 
concerns that large donations by overly animated donors could have a 
“coercive influence . . . on candidates[.]”67 The Court left unaddressed 
the concern that donors, not candidates, face undue pressure in the 
current campaign finance system. 
B. From Buckley to McCutcheon 
For the purposes of the present argument, one can cover the ground 
from 1976 to 2014 fairly quickly. Buckley, alternatively reviled and 
praised, continued to provide the constitutional framework for analyzing 
campaign finance restrictions.
68
 For a time, the Supreme Court took an 
expansive view of the nature of the corruption that the government could 
constitutionally target through contribution limitations, as well as of the 
risk of donors potentially circumventing these limitations, upholding 
restrictions justified by the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form”69 and by the appearance of “improper influence” by the 
donor.
70
 To the extent concerns about “extortionate” behavior by 
lawmakers were raised (rarely), they were used to validate the 
government’s broad interest in addressing corruption.71 The dominant 
narrative continued to be that special interests seeking undue political 
advantage were attempting to overrun the system with money.
72
 “Leave 
the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption 
that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters 
to take part in democratic governance,” the Court wrote in 2000.73 
                                                     
67. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. 
68. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 
93 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); First 
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
69. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
70. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 388–89 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28). 
71. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143; Brief of Amici Curiae Bipartisan Former Members of 
Congress in Support of Appellees at 2–29, McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (No. 02-1674); see also infra 
note 176. 
72. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129–33 (detailing the rapid rise of special interest soft 
money in the 1990s); FEC v. Col. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 454 (2001) 
(“While parties command bigger spending budgets than most individuals, some individuals could 
easily rival party committees in spending. Rich political activists crop up, and the United States has 
known its Citizens Kane. Their money speaks loudly, too, and they are therefore burdened by 
restrictions on its use just as parties are.”). 
73. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 390. 
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To the extent that campaign finance laws were designed to reduce the 
amount of money in federal elections, they have been a failure. Total 
election spending grew from $310 million in 1976 to more than $6 
billion in 2012.
74
 In the 1990s, prior FEC rulings that allowed the 
national political parties to raise funds largely unrestricted in source or 
amount so long as they were not used on “express” advocacy became a 
loophole that threatened to overtake traditional election fundraising.
75
 
This rise of unregulated “soft money” and the related phenomenon of 
“issue ads”—non-express (and thus non-regulated) advocacy that 
seemed nevertheless designed to impact elections—triggered a fresh 
round of amendments to FECA, culminating in BCRA in 2002.
76
 The 
revised law kept a cap on hard money contributions to candidates, 
affiliated committees, and national parties as to both the base and 
aggregate amounts, although it raised both limits significantly and 
permitted some of them to be adjusted upward for inflation, an 
allowance that FECA had not previously provided.
77
 
In McConnell v. FEC,
78
 the first challenge to BCRA, the Supreme 
Court upheld, inter alia, BCRA’s ban on soft money and restrictions 
targeted at the profusion of issue ads by both parties and outside 
groups.
79
 For campaign finance advocates, it was an ephemeral victory. 
In the decade following McConnell, the composition of the Supreme 
Court changed and so too did its view on the constitutionality of various 
provisions of BCRA.
80
 In a series of decisions, a majority of the Court 
                                                     
74. See FEC, FISCAL YEAR 2008 PERFORMANCE BUDGET FOR THE FEDERAL ELECTION 
COMMISSION 1, 6 (2007), available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/budget/fy2008/ 
fy2008cbj_final.pdf; Russ Choma, The 2012 Election: Our Price Tag (Finally) for the Whole Ball 
of Wax, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/03/the-2012-
election-our-price-tag-fin/ (calculating the 2012 figures as $2.6 billion for the presidential election 
and $3.6 billion for congressional elections). The value of $310 million in 1976 was approximately 
$1.26 billion in 2012 dollars. See DOLLAR TIMES, http://www.dollartimes.com/ 
inflation/inflation.php?amount=310000000&year=1976 (last visited July 19, 2015). 
75. See FEC Adv. Op. 1978-10 (Aug. 29, 1987); FEC Adv. Op. 1979-17 (July 16, 1979); 
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 124 (noting soft money, or funds raised by federal candidates for political 
parties that could be spent on anything other than express advocacy, grew from five percent—$21.6 
million—of national party spending in 1984 to forty-two percent—$498 million—in 2000); see also 
The Money Behind the Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ (last 
visited July 19, 2015). 
76. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 607 (2012), 36 U.S.C. §§ 510–511 (2012), 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2012), and in scattered 
sections of 2 U.S.C. and 52 U.S.C.). 
77. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116, 30125(e)(1) (2012).  
78. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
79. Id. at 145–46, 225. 
80. See Richard L. Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp 
 
12 - Mueller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:08 PM 
1800 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1783 
 
took an increasingly robust view of the First Amendment rights of 
speakers in a political contest and an increasingly skeptical view of the 
fit between campaign finance limitations and the underlying risks of 
corruption, the appearance of corruption, or circumvention.
81
 Most 
notably, in Citizens United the Court struck down a ban on corporations 
using their general treasury funds (as opposed to PAC dollars) for 
independent expenditures that expressly support or oppose a candidate.
82
 
In doing so, the Court narrowed the “compelling interests” that the 
government could assert in defense of campaign finance restrictions.
83
 
Both Justice Kennedy and, in a concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts 
opined that only quid pro quo corruption was a proper target of 
campaign finance expenditure restrictions.
84
 
The First Amendment interests of the donor qua speaker were thus 
ascendant as Shaun McCutcheon brought his challenge to BCRA’s 
aggregate campaign limits. Where once concerns about access, 
influence, and the distortion of wealth may have offered legitimate 
grounds on which to find a risk of corruption and uphold campaign 
finance restrictions,
85
 as the Court took up McCutcheon there remained 
only two legitimate rationales for campaign finance limitations that 
impede a political donor’s ability to express himself freely: the risk of an 
actual exchange of dollars for political favors and, relatedly, the risk that 
without regulation the safeguards of the campaign finance system might 
be circumvented. 
                                                     
Right Turn but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists 5 (Aug. 4, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the University of California, Irvine School of Law). 
81. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (holding that independent expenditures 
are not corrupting and striking down ban on corporate independent expenditures and electioneering 
communications); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738 (2008) (striking down BCRA’s “Millionaire’s 
Amendment”); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (significantly narrowing 
BCRA’s definition of “electioneering communications”). 
82. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359; id. at 383–84 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
83. The Court explicitly rejected the proposition that the government had a compelling interest in 
addressing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of [corporate] wealth that 
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas” and appeared to also reject the concept that the 
risk of special influence or access in return for a contribution provided constitutional justification 
for campaign finance restrictions. Id. at 348 (majority opinion) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).  
84. Id. at 359; id. at 383–84 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
85. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115–20, 123–31 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 385 (2000); Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
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C. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission 
Shaun McCutcheon was a staunch Republican who wished to give at 
least $1776 to more than twenty-five candidates’ campaigns in the 
2011–2012 election cycle.86 In 2012, he filed a lawsuit asserting his right 
to make contributions within the base limits but in excess of the 
aggregate limits. The question that received little attention in Buckley 
thus returned to the Court in center stage.
87
 
Supreme Court briefing and oral argument in McCutcheon focused on 
the classic campaign finance protagonist: the willing or even over-eager 
donor.
88
 A significant amount of argument time—and the resulting 
opinions—dwelt on the risk that a donor might circumvent the base 
limits if the aggregate caps were removed.
89
 Chief Justice Roberts’ 
plurality opinion expressed skepticism that candidates and parties would 
engage in complicated transactions in order to funnel more than the 
permitted amount of money from a single donor to a single candidate or 
slate of candidates; the dissent, authored by Justice Breyer, was 
significantly less skeptical.
90
 
Ultimately, however, the aggregate limits fell because they were not 
drawn, in the plurality’s view, closely enough to advance the 
                                                     
86. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10–13, McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 
F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 12-1034), available at https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-
courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2012cv01034/154907/1/0.pdf?ts=1376358875. The Republican 
National Committee was also a party in the suit. Id. at 1. 
87. As an initial matter, a majority of Justices rejected the notion that the Court was bound by 
Buckley’s treatment of the issue. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444–46 
(2014) (plurality opinion); id. at 1462–65 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only). The plurality 
opinion noted that the parties there had not presented arguments on the aggregate limits and that the 
Court’s reasoning on the matter had encompassed only a few sentences. Id. at 1438 (plurality 
opinion). 
88. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536) 
[hereinafter McCutcheon Transcript]; Brief for Appellant Shaun McCutcheon, McCutcheon, 134 S. 
Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536); Brief on the Merits for Appellant Republican National Committee, 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536); Brief for the Appellee, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 
(No. 12-536); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Rights Union in Support of Appellants, 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536); Brief of Americans for Campaign Reform as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Appellee, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536). More than twenty-five 
briefs were filed with the Supreme Court in the case.  
89. McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at 3–55; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442–49, 1452–
62; id. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only); id. at 1465–67, 1471–80 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
90. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1454–56 (plurality opinion) (dismissing circumvention 
scenarios described by the Government as “implausible” and “divorced from reality”); id. at 1473–
77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing three detailed examples of how circumvention could be 
achieved).  
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government’s compelling interests.91 The Justices who formed the 
plurality posed two questions during oral argument that the Solicitor 
General struggled to answer. First, why was contributing up to the base 
limit to a tenth candidate more corrupting than giving the same amount 
to the previous nine?
92
 Second, how could the government justify its 
fears about the risk of removing the aggregate limit on direct 
contributions when restrictions on independent expenditures are virtually 
non-existent?
93
 That is, why should the Court be concerned about the 
corrupting influence of the $5200 a donor could contribute directly to a 
candidate when the same donor could independently spend $40 million 
running ads supporting her candidacy? Surely, the plurality reasoned, the 
latter act would engender the same or higher levels of gratitude in the 
beneficiary.
94
 
Apparently receiving no satisfactory answer, the plurality determined 
that the aggregate caps were not narrowly tailored to address the 
corruption risk.
95
 It is here that the plurality made the doctrinal shift that 
has attracted by far the most commentary: It explicitly narrowed the 
grounds upon which campaign finance contribution restrictions could be 
constitutionally justified.
96
 Notwithstanding its dismissal of “just three 
sentences” on aggregate limits in Buckley, the plurality seized on three 
words from that same opinion—quid pro quo—to limit the kind of 
                                                     
91. Id. at 1456 (plurality opinion). The Court declined to adopt strict scrutiny to analyze 
contribution restrictions, id. at 1445–46, but several commentators, including Justice Thomas in his 
concurrence, have observed that there seems to be little room between the approach the plurality 
took and strict scrutiny, see id. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only); Hasen, supra 
note 24 (arguing that the plurality’s “strict corruption” approach does the work of “strict scrutiny”). 
92. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (plurality opinion); McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at 
46–47. 
93. McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at 30–35. 
94. Id. at 34; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1454. Justice Kagan’s suggestion that the Court 
could revisit its ruling that independent expenditures are not corrupting in the campaign context was 
met with laughter. McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at 54; cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co., 556 U.S. 868, 888–89 (2009) (finding that large independent expenditures risked 
compromising judicial impartiality). 
95. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–57 (finding that the caps were not “closely drawn to avoid 
unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 
(1976))). 
96. Id. at 1444; see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After 
McCutcheon, Citizens United, and Speech Now, 67 FLA. L. REV. 389, 469–70 (2015); Liz Kennedy 
& Seth Katsuya Endo, The World According to, and After, McCutcheon v. FEC, and Why It 
Matters, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 533, 552–562 (2015); Marc E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, After 
McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. 373 (2014); see also supra note 23. The Court had made a similar 
determination regarding independent expenditures in Citizens United. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310, 336 (2010). 
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corruption that Congress is permitted to target without running afoul of 
the First Amendment.
97
 Thus, after McCutcheon, only the government’s 
concerns about the actual exchange of “dollars for political favors” can 
justify campaign contribution limitations.
98
 Moreover, the plurality 
wrote, “the risk of quid pro quo corruption is generally applicable only 
to the ‘narrow category of money gifts that are directed, in some manner, 
to a candidate or officeholder.’”99 
Less widely noted but also critical for the present discussion, the 
McCutcheon plurality also re-framed the constitutional interests at issue. 
The Buckley Court had found that “the primary First Amendment 
problem raised by the Act’s contribution limitations is their restriction of 
one aspect of the contributor’s freedom of political association”; it is the 
act of giving rather than the amount that triggers the First Amendment 
concerns, and those concerns are more about association than speech.
100
 
The McCutcheon plurality, however, rejected the notion that the amount 
given is not constitutionally significant.
101
 In its view, more money 
                                                     
97. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448–52. The dissent would have continued to apply the 
comparatively broad definition of corruption that the Court had used in McConnell and earlier cases. 
Id. at 1169–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In a dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, Justice Breyer faulted the plurality for not explicitly overturning this fairly recent precedent. 
Id. at 1471. 
98. Id. at 1441 (plurality opinion) (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 457 
U.S. 480, 497 (1985)). The Court has taken a more expansive view of the risk of corruption in 
judicial elections. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding a 
state law banning judges from personally soliciting campaign funds for their campaigns); Caperton, 
556 U.S. at 873, 884 (requiring recusal of a judge who received $3 million in judicial campaign 
contributions from a litigant). 
99. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451–52 (emphasis in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 
U.S. 90, 310 (2003)); see also Mark D. Rosen, When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute? 
McCutcheon, Conflicts, and the Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1535, 1606–09 
(2015) (faulting the plurality for concluding in this context “that no other countervailing 
consideration or set of considerations is sufficiently important to permit a speech limitation”). The 
plurality suggested that narrower restrictions on earmarking and transfers might pass constitutional 
muster, but this would require action from either Congress or the FEC, both of which have reached 
near-historic levels of gridlock. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1458–59; see also Jennifer Mueller, 
Defending Nuance in an Era of Tea Party Politics: An Argument for the Continued Use of 
Standards to Evaluate the Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4) Organizations, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
103, 153–55 (2014) (describing recent FEC dysfunction); cf. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. __, 
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (noting, after striking down part of the Voting Rights Act, that 
Congress could pass a revised law with an appropriate coverage formula, something that has not 
happened and seems unlikely to happen in the near future). See generally Richard L. Hasen, End of 
the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205 
(2013) (discussing how increased polarization of Congress has resulted in a decline of congressional 
overrides of Supreme Court decisions). 
100. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24. 
101. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449 (“To require one person to contribute at lower levels than 
others because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on 
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equals more speech, and thus any limit burdens both the speech and 
association rights of a contributor.
102
  
In so ruling, the McCutcheon plurality emphasized the role of the 
First Amendment in creating and protecting rights for individuals, as 
opposed to any larger structural role it may play.
103
 In contrast, the 
Buckley majority, as demonstrated by the language quoted above, 
highlighted the role of the First Amendment in protecting and creating 
informed political choice.
104
 It is perhaps a crude measure, but it is worth 
noting that the word “individual” appears nowhere in the section of 
Buckley that lays out the “general principles” that provided the 
constitutional foundation for the decision.
105
 It appears more than a 
dozen times in the parallel section of McCutcheon.
106
 It is, however, 
difficult to balance a particularized individual right against a more 
amorphous structural value.
107
 Thus, the McCutcheon plurality could 
                                                     
broader participation in the democratic process.”). 
102. Id. at 1456; see also Justin Levitt, Electoral Integrity: The Confidence Game, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. ONLINE 70, 84–85 (2014) (arguing that the plurality’s framing of the aggregate limits as 
denying an individual “all ability to exercise his associational and expressive rights by contributing 
to someone who will advocate for his policy preferences,” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448, is “a 
description of burden as dangerously unmoored as the most unbounded assertion of regulation in the 
name of electoral integrity,” Levitt, supra). 
103. The dissent took issue with this characterization. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the First Amendment advances not only the individual’s right 
to engage in political speech, but also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which 
collective speech matters,” and adding that this purpose “has everything to do with corruption”). But 
see id. at 1449–50 (plurality opinion) (rejecting “such a generalized conception of the public 
good”). Cf. Pildes, supra note 37; Rosen, supra note 37; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, 
Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648 
(1998) (“Rather than seeking to control politics directly through the centralized enforcement of 
individual rights, we suggest courts would do better to examine the background structure of partisan 
competition.”). 
104. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14–24. The McCutcheon dissent made much of this history. See 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Eighty-seven years ago, Justice Brandeis 
wrote that the First Amendment’s protection of speech was ‘essential to effective democracy.’ 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion). Chief Justice Hughes 
reiterated the same idea shortly thereafter: ‘A fundamental principle of our constitutional system’ is 
the ‘maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be 
responsive to the will of the people.’ Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).”); cf. POST, 
supra note 37, at 13–43 (describing the changing role of the First Amendment in American political 
history).  
105. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14–23. 
106. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448–50. For example, “[a]s relevant here, the First Amendment 
safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the public debate through political expression and 
political association. . . . When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises both of 
those rights.” Id. at 1448. 
107. Cf. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 166–74 (2011) (reporting on 
experiments that demonstrated subjects’ preference for—and reliance on—individual examples 
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write that “[i]n drawing [the] line [between illegal quid pro quo 
corruption and legal generalized influence], the First Amendment 
requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than 
suppressing it.”108 A tie between individual rights and structural 
concerns goes to the individual rights of the speaker, and so it follows 
that only individual corruption—acts of quid pro quo exchange—can 
provide a counterweight. As discussed further below, this framework 
assumes a great deal about the willingness of the donor and the nature of 
the speech protected. 
As to Buckley’s other rationales in support of upholding the 
contribution cap, the plurality considered and dismissed the possibility 
that an alternative route existed for a donor wishing to exercise his rights 
of association if the caps remained in place. For a donor like Mr. 
McCutcheon who wished to support many candidates, the plurality 
reasoned that volunteering individually with every campaign could 
prove too burdensome.
109
 The plurality did not, however, address 
whether suitable alternative channels existed through which a donor 
could exercise his free speech rights even if the caps remained (e.g., 
independent expenditures).
110
 Neither did it discuss whether the 
aggregate caps posed “any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of 
campaigns and political associations.”111 More peculiarly, it considered 
only briefly the concern that in the absence of the aggregate cap 
candidates could solicit up to $3.6 million from an individual donor.
112
 
                                                     
rather than statistical probabilities when explaining events). 
108. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 
(2007)). The Buckley Court had considered a nearly identical overbreadth challenge and rejected it. 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (recognizing the likelihood that some non-corrupting speech would be 
curtailed by the contribution limits but finding that “Congress was justified in concluding that the 
interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for 
abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated”). 
109. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449. 
110. The plurality’s failure to consider whether a donor’s ability to spend unlimited amounts on 
independent expenditures eased any First Amendment burden posed by contribution caps may have 
been a “tell.” Commentators have opined that the plurality was motivated in part by recognition that 
in recent election cycles, and especially since Citizens United, the power of political parties has 
diminished vis à vis outside groups such as SuperPACs. See, e.g., Anthony J. Gaughan, In Defense 
of McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 221, 254–60 (2015); 
Lee Drutman, What the McCutcheon Decision Means, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/02/what-the-mccutcheon-
decision-means/. The decision in McCutcheon will certainly be to the parties’ benefit. See infra note 
300. 
111. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.  
112. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456; see Peter Olsen-Phillips, Joint Fundraisers Ballooning 
After McCutcheon Decision, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2014, 3:12 PM), 
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This last point is worth pausing upon, as it comes closest to touching 
on the concerns of the unwilling donor.
113
 The Government argued that 
the aggregate limits should be upheld for two reasons. The first 
justification—and the primary focus of the arguments and opinions—
was that they helped prevent circumvention of the base limits, as the 
Buckley Court had held. A second, less-developed argument advanced 
by the Government was that without the aggregate caps the sheer 
amount of money that a candidate or elected official could solicit—in 
the name not only of her own campaign, but also, through leadership 
PACs
114
 or joint fundraising committees,
115
 of her colleagues and state 
and national party committees—had the potential to corrupt, or at least 
appear to corrupt, the most well-intentioned of officials.
116
 The 
aggregate limits, the Government suggested, served an independent anti-
corruption function in addition to an anti-circumvention function. The 
                                                     
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/10/29/joint-fundraisers-ballooning-after-mccutcheon-
decision/ (reporting that by late 2014, candidates and parties had formed over 200 joint fundraising 
committees). In the wake of Congress’s appropriations act passed in December 2014, candidates can 
now solicit $5.1 million from an individual donor. See Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. 2130, 2772–73 (2014) (to 
be codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30116) (raising the contribution caps and permitting national party 
committees to establish separate accounts, each with elevated contribution limits of $100,200 
annually).  
113. The fact that the plurality, concurrence, and dissent spent so little time considering the 
coercive effects of the large amounts of money about to flow directly to candidates and parties—the 
issue arguably most germane to the unwilling donor—likely reflects the scant attention it received 
by the parties and amici. See Justin Levitt, Symposium: Aggregate Limits and the Fight over Frame, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 16, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/symposium-
aggregate-limits-and-the-fight-over-frame/ (noting that the role of elected officials and candidates in 
leveraging contributions was largely ignored in the filings). 
114. A Leadership PAC pays for expenses that are ineligible for coverage by campaign 
committees or congressional offices, such as certain travel and funding for other candidates’ 
campaigns. See Leadership PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/ 
indus.php?ind=Q03 (last updated July 2015); see also infra notes 127, 199. 
115. Created by two or more PACs, party committees, or candidates, joint fundraising 
committees share fundraising costs and split fundraising proceeds, with the caveat that a donor 
cannot give more money to the joint committee than he could give directly to each candidate. 
However, the donor can write a single check for several candidates. See Joint Fundraising 
Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/jfc/ (last visited July 20, 2015). For 
example, in the 2014 cycle, the top twenty donors to the Boehner for Speaker joint fundraising 
committee made contributions between $133,000 and $425,300. Boehner for Speaker Cmte, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/jfc/donors.php?id=C00478354&cycle=2014 (last 
visited July 20, 2015). 
116. McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at 46–54. The plurality seemed to suggest that these 
arguments were raised for the first time at oral argument, see McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460, but 
they were made, albeit briefly, in the Government’s brief, Brief for the Appellee, supra note 88, at 
53–54. 
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plurality rejected this argument.
117
 
After McCutcheon, it appears that the Supreme Court has moved from 
viewing campaign finance restrictions as appropriate tools by which the 
government may attempt systemic reform to viewing them as acceptable 
means of backstopping existing anti-corruption criminal laws, such as 
those outlawing bribery.
118
 Likewise, the focus appears to be less on the 
value of political speech to our representative system of government and 
more on the First Amendment rights of individual citizens.
119
 These 
rhetorical shifts are complicated if one introduces the idea that some 
donors in fact are not willing contributors. 
II.  LOOKING FOR THE UNWILLING DONOR 
A political observer may greet the notion of the unwilling or reluctant 
donor with some skepticism. Not only does such a concept defy the 
conventional narrative, but there is perhaps an instinctive resistance to it. 
After all, neither politics nor wealth typically engender feelings of 
sympathy, and in recent election cycles some donors have commanded 
the media spotlight with prominent commitments of money in support of 
one party or the other.
120
 This is not an article about independent 
                                                     
117. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1440–41, 1460–62 (“For our purposes here, it is enough that the 
aggregate limits at issue are not directed specifically to candidate behavior.”). 
118. Commentators have noted that despite the apparent clarity of “quid pro quo,” it provides 
little if any direction to a legislator or regulator in the campaign finance context. Zephyr Teachout 
notes this tension in a forthcoming Article: 
Courts use different techniques to limit the potentially awesome reach of [bribery] statutes: 
they require that the bribe be express (spoken or written), or they require that the governmental 
action required be identified. Sometimes they use the term “quid pro quo” to serve these 
limiting functions. . . . [But] these important roles are not relevant when judging whether a 
bright-line statute is legitimately motivated by [a] compelling need to stop corruption. In the 
campaign finance context, they serve a different function. They provide a sense . . . of clearly 
defined and definable scope. Perhaps the reason the Court is so drawn to it is that the use of the 
contract language (quid pro quo) gives a false sense of specificity to a concept that is 
essentially awkward in the criminal law context. The increased emphatic use of “quid pro quo” 
provides a psychological experience of certainty, as the Latinate sounds more particular than 
non-particular. It sounds tractable. . . . At an emotional level, the language sounds concrete 
enough to overcome the essential ambiguity with proof of intent and motive in corruption 
cases. 
Zephyr Teachout, McCutcheon and the Meaning of Corruption: Not All Quid Pro Quos Are Made 
of the Same Stuff 21 (Fordham Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2387041, 2014) (emphasis 
in original), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2387041. 
119. Robert Post suggests that the First Amendment has twin goals of protecting both 
representative government, centered around elections as decision points, and “discursive 
democracy,” in which citizens are in regular communication with elected officials and officials are 
responsive to the public on an ongoing basis, which roughly tracks this divide in emphasis. See 
POST, supra note 37, at 36–42, 59–66. 
120. See, e.g., Steven Bertoni, Billionaire Sheldon Adelson Says He Might Give $100M to Newt 
Gingrich or Other Republican, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2012, 12:04 AM), 
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expenditures, however, and sympathy is not a constitutional touchstone. 
This section develops the narrative of the unwilling donor and identifies 
significant evidence of his existence, not just in the present day but also 
in events precipitating earlier campaign finance laws. 
A. Two Stories About Campaign Finance 
McCutcheon shows the continued dominance of the campaign finance 
narrative that informed Buckley. In this story, self-serving business 
people with deep pockets—the nefarious “special interests”—dangle 
large amounts of money before candidates to sway their actions.
121
 This 
story has a long and sordid pedigree, and there is abundant evidence to 
suggest that the capture of public officials and agencies by private 
interests remains a valid concern—thus the unease by Justices in earlier 
campaign finance cases about donor “access” and “influence.”122 
However, one could quite as easily tell an alternative story about 
campaign contributions and donors today, one in which donors are less 
complicit and more coerced. This alternate narrative, one for which there 
is considerable support, both complicates traditional campaign finance 
doctrine and offers a new framework for evaluating campaign finance 
restrictions. 
Consider two donors. The first is the person whom the McCutcheon 
plurality appears to have had as its frame of reference.
123
 Let’s call him 
Mr. Gold. He is quite wealthy and wishes to become politically involved 
                                                     
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2012/02/21/billionaire-sheldon-adelson-says-he-might-
give-100m-to-newt-gingrich-or-other-republican/ (detailing a Forbes interview with billionaire 
Sheldon Adelson, who said he was willing to spend $100 million to beat President Obama); see also 
supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text. 
121. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441–42; id. at 1469–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–27 (1975); Brief for the Attorney Gen. and the Fed. Election 
Comm’n at 22, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (Nos. 75-436, 75-437) (“[Restoration of public confidence] is a 
critical [objective] in times of deep public suspicion and apathy grounded in the citizens’ belief that 
‘their’ representatives are often captives of wealthy special interests.”). 
122. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124–26 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 
528 U.S. 377, 388–89 (2000); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990); 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–27. 
123. More than one critic has referred to the plurality’s opinion as “naïve.” See Billy Corriher, 
Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence Displays a Naïve View of Political Corruption, 
CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-
liberties/news/2014/04/02/87044/supreme-courts-campaign-finance-jurisprudence-displays-a-naive-
view-of-political-corruption/; Richard L. Hasen, Symposium: Does the Chief Justice Not 
Understand Politics, or Does He Understand It All Too Well?, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:38 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/symposium-does-the-chief-justice-not-understand-
politics-or-does-he-understand-it-all-too-well/; Posner, supra note 23. 
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in order to support candidates for office who support laws with which he 
agrees. Some of those laws might benefit him personally or financially, 
while others reflect the kind of future he hopes for America. Mr. Gold 
does not have a “nefarious” side agenda or significant lobbying interest. 
He just wants to support all of the candidates and party committees that 
agree with his policy positions to the maximum extent he is fortunate 
and able to do so. The money that Mr. Gold contributes to each 
candidate is spent on expressive speech in support of their candidacy (or 
possibly to attack their opponents). If Mr. Gold’s candidates win and 
support or oppose measures in the legislature in a way that aligns with 
his views, that is just a natural result of the political process and the way 
representative democracy is supposed to work. If Mr. Gold explicitly 
asks for anything in return for his campaign contributions, that is bribery 
and illegal under both federal and state law. To deny Mr. Gold the 
opportunity to participate in the electoral process through making 
campaign contributions to the maximum extent he wishes to do so would 
be to deny him his core First Amendment rights of expression and 
association. 
But one could tell—and some have124—another story. We might 
imagine another wealthy individual; let’s call him Mr. Silver. Mr. Silver 
is not very interested in politics, but he does care about his business and 
he believes he has a responsibility to safeguard its future and 
profitability—for his employees, board of directors, shareholders, or just 
his personal sense of duty. He learns that there is a proposed piece of 
legislation making its way through Congress that is likely to impact this 
business. He calls his representative and lets her know he is concerned 
about the bill. The next day Mr. Silver receives a call from his 
representative’s chief fundraiser inviting him to a fundraising dinner 
with her next week. They notice he has not donated before. (Or perhaps 
he has donated before—$250 for a fundraiser hosted by Mr. Silver’s 
friend a few years ago. The analysis would not be different. Likewise, 
the story does not depend on the existence of proposed legislation or 
who initiates the contact; every industry is regulated or could be 
regulated.) The price for the fundraiser is $2500. He is also encouraged 
to support her leadership PAC, which can accept a donation of up to 
$10,000 per two-year cycle.
125
 
Mr. Silver does not feel strongly about this representative—not $2500 
                                                     
124. See SCHWEIZER, supra note 27; JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: THE HARD TRUTH 
ABOUT WASHINGTON CORRUPTION FROM AMERICA’S MOST NOTORIOUS LOBBYIST 270–72 (2011); 
MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 45–68. 
125. See supra notes 110, 114. 
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strongly, and certainly not $10,000 strongly—but he is aware that he is 
asking her to do something for him, so he feels obligated to do 
something for her. He may even talk to a politically connected friend of 
his, who advises him that he must “pay to play.” He attends the dinner, 
which is at an expensive steakhouse, and speaks with the candidate 
about the proposed legislation. She indicates that the upcoming vote 
poses tough issues, and that she believes the other party is mobilizing on 
the other side. She asks what the legislative change could cost his 
company. She encourages him to donate to the national party 
committees and suggests that other people at his company would be 
welcome to “join the fight.” She lets him know that she looks at donor 
lists each week and thanks him for his contribution. She mentions one or 
two colleagues who she thinks would appreciate his support and who she 
believes could be favorably inclined toward his point of view (although 
she politely declines to commit her own vote). The week before the vote, 
the representative’s fundraiser reaches out to Mr. Silver and asks if he’s 
given to her joint fundraising committee, which supports the party and 
like-minded candidates.
126
 She believes others are giving at the $15,000 
level. Again, Mr. Silver does not want to give, but he feels he cannot say 
no given how much is riding on the bill. He is ambivalent about his 
representative—he has never had a big interest in politics, and he didn’t 
even vote for her—but he cares very much about the legislation, and he 
would hate to think that he did not do everything in his power to make a 
difference, especially as the requested contribution, while uncomfortably 
large as a symbol of his support, is nevertheless far smaller than the 
bill’s potential impact. He writes another check. It is still more than a 
year until the representative’s election, and while some of the money he 
contributes does eventually get spent in political advertisements, more of 
it is spent on lavish fundraiser events, including long weekends at an 
exclusive spa resort and meals at her favorite sushi restaurant. It also 
helps her secure a position in the party leadership.
127
 As for Mr. Silver, 
                                                     
126. While congressional ethics rules ban a lawmaker from soliciting funds from a corporation 
while also working on legislation supported by that corporation, these often fail to constrain such 
activity. See generally STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ETHICS, IN THE MATTER OF ALLEGATIONS 
RELATING TO FUNDRAISING ACTIVITIES AND THE HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 4173, H.R. 112-4137, 1ST 
SESS. (2011), available at http://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/documents/Wall% 
20Street%20Bill%20Report_Final.pdf (finding no appearance of impropriety when Members 
attended fundraisers with donors interested in pending financial services legislation because, inter 
alia, the Members used separate staff for fundraising and the events were open to donors outside the 
financial services industry). 
127. Evidence suggests that some of these funds may in fact be used to directly influence 
legislative outcomes, but such expenditures are made by elected officials, not contributors. 
Observers have tracked transfers from the leadership PACs of both parties’ political leadership to 
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over the coming months his phone begins to ring more and more 
frequently with calls from fundraisers from both parties. He continues to 
give, fearing repercussions if he does not.
128
 
Of course, each of these stories might be true for some donors at some 
times. But only one appears in campaign finance jurisprudence. Mr. 
Silver’s story is not about “the unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people” or 
“the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices.”129 It is, rather, 
about citizens who do not wish to make political contributions but do not 
feel that they can say no because they are afraid of the consequences if 
they do not.
130
 It is a story that captures what game theorists might call 
the rational coercion of our current campaign finance system.
131
 Political 
                                                     
other elected officials and found them to be closely correlated, in timing and outcome, to recipient’s 
support for the donor’s legislative initiatives or support for donor’s leadership run. SCHWEIZER, 
supra note 27, at 68–73; see also Paul Blumenthal, Potential House Health Care Vote Switchers 
Reliant on Party Campaign Money, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2010, 12:02 PM), 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/03/03/potential-house-health-care-vote-switchers-reliant-
on-party-campaign-money/; Kent Cooper, Paul Ryan’s PAC Provides $80,000 to Members on Key 
Standing Committees, ROLL CALL (Oct. 18, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/ 
moneyline/paul-ryan-provides-80000-to-members-on-key-standing-committees/. 
128. Mr. Silver is a hypothetical character, but it bears mentioning that real life individuals have 
found themselves in similar situations. In 1973, George Spater, former chairman and CEO of 
American Airlines, testified before Congress that he directed that $75,000 be given to the 
Committee to Reelect the President not because he supported President Nixon’s candidacy but 
because “I was fearful if I didn’t do it our company would be placed at a competitive disadvantage.” 
Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972: Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Presidential 
Campaign Activities of the U.S. Senate, 93d Cong. 5511 (1973) (statement of George Spater, former 
chairman and CEO of American Airlines). More recently, researchers interviewed a “person who 
worked for an outside group that also made PAC contributions” who reported “being ‘shaken down’ 
for money by Members, including being screamed at by Members and told things like a ‘$1,000 
contribution is demeaning.’” DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E.B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY: 
OUTSIDE SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (2014), available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/thenewsoftmoney/wp-content/uploads/sites/57/2014/06/the-new-soft-
money-WEB.pdf; see also supra notes 19, 26. 
129. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976).  
130. While beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that Mr. Silver’s story is also about 
candidates who feel they must make the most of every fundraising opportunity because they know 
many of their opponents—or their opponents’ fundraising teams—will do the same. See, e.g., Brief 
of Amici Curiae Bipartisan Former Members of Congress in Support of Appellees at 3–14, 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 02-1674) (“Members of Congress quickly learn that if 
they do not provide time and attention to large donors, and if they do not act to influence or 
acquiesce in legislative decisions favoring such large donors, then they and their party are likely to 
be at a serious disadvantage.”); TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 128, at 90 (“In numerous 
interviews, both with Members and with staff, we heard that the possibility for large amounts of 
outside spending had created an even greater sense of urgency to raise as much money as possible 
for their own campaigns than existed in years past and that as a result, candidates spent more time 
on the phone asking for money.”). 
131. See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day Prisoner’s 
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choice theorists might call it rent extraction.
132
 Others call it extortion.
133
 
The next two sections consider evidence that this story may be a viable 
counter-narrative to the one that has occupied the Supreme Court for the 
last four decades; the Part following considers the doctrinal implications. 
B. Signs of the Unwilling Donor 
What is perhaps most remarkable about the unwilling donor is how 
long his story has been overlooked. The bribery narrative is so pervasive 
that notwithstanding testimony during the Watergate hearings that 
certain donors to Nixon’s reelection campaign contributed solely out of 
fear of repercussions if they did not, the word “extortion” barely even 
appears in any of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance cases.134 
There is a parallel here to public choice theory, which applies an 
economic cost-benefit analysis to explain how political choices are 
made.
135
 For a long time public choice scholars explained government 
policy choices through a model that bore echoes of the dominant 
campaign finance narrative described above, a model in which the 
motives of an interested donor, as a “purchaser,” or “rent seeker,” drove 
a transaction and set its price. Regulatory inefficiencies (in which the 
                                                     
Dilemma, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105 (2011). The donor-candidate dynamic is a rich area for game 
theorists. From parallels to the classic prisoner’s dilemma to more nuanced considerations of repeat 
players, signaling, coalition dynamics, and free rider problems, academics look for models to 
predict contribution patterns. See, e.g., id.; Marcos Chamon & Ethan Kaplan, The Iceberg Theory of 
Campaign Contributions: Political Threats and Interest Group Behavior, 5 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. 
POL’Y 1 (2013). For present purposes, however, it is enough to understand that many wealthy 
donors are likely to give if asked regardless of their policy preferences; the risk to an unwilling 
donor’s business interests should a lawmaker not be favorably inclined to him is such that the 
contribution is a reasonable hedge. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 30; Racquel Meyer Alexander, 
Stephen W. Mazza & Susan Scholz, Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An 
Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations (2009) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Washington Law Review). 
132. See supra notes 28–30. 
133. SCHWEIZER, supra note 27; Fitzpatrick & Griffin, supra note 26. 
134. In fact, extortion is mentioned in only two Supreme Court cases discussing political 
campaigns since Buckley, and then only in passing. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 471 
(2010) (Stevens, J. concurring) (citing Sitkoff, supra note 31, at 1113); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 n.12 (1995) (quoting the language of a statute). Interestingly, earlier 
cases gave it slightly more due. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 606 (1973) (suggesting 
that campaign restrictions serve a valid state interest in protecting against “political extortion”); 
United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 
567, 579 (1957) (discussing how unions extorted dues from union workers, which were later used as 
political contributions). 
135. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice 
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 276–77 (1988). 
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outcome was not optimized for the public benefit) were explained by 
uncovering private donors’ improper attempts to “capture” a public 
good.
136
 Public choice scholars observed, however, that some 
transactions did not fit this empirical model.
137
 It was nearly three 
decades before Fred McChesney, building off of earlier studies, 
identified the critical oversight in his analysis of public choice theory, 
Money for Nothing.
138
 Previous scholarship, he noted, had failed to 
account for a key figure in the story of legislative and regulatory change: 
the motivated public official as the “seller,” or “rent extractor.” 
Professor McChesney reported that whereas “many episodes of private 
payment are simply inexplicable” as economically efficient acts 
benefiting the rent seeker, they make sense if understood to be made 
“not for particular political favors, but to avoid particular political 
disfavor, that is, as part of a system of political 
extortion . . . [representing] a conscious, welfare-maximizing strategy 
for politicians personally.”139 
Professor McChesney’s observations showed that there is something 
to be gained in teasing apart differences that might at first appear to be 
merely subjective or rhetorical. After all, bribery and extortion are not 
very different concepts; one might call them the opposite sides of the 
same coin. But just as recognizing the phenomenon of rent extraction 
helped demonstrate the validity of and further refine public choice 
theory, viewing campaign finance doctrine through the frame of the 
unwilling donor allows us to see gaps in the Supreme Court’s campaign 
finance jurisprudence and test the robustness of its formulations. As will 
be discussed further in the concluding sections of this Article, flipping 
the story of campaign finance brings certain concerns into sharp relief. It 
reinforces the coercive nature of the campaign finance system and the 
need for systemic reform, it destabilizes the Court’s current emphasis on 
quid pro quo corruption, and it elevates the First Amendment interests of 
the donor who feels he must contribute in ways that do not align with his 
true political preferences. 
                                                     
136. Buchanan, supra note 29; Krueger, supra note 29. 
137. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 9–19, 158–59; see also id. at 18 (“Observers note that 
creation of rents does not seem to explain many of the regulatory statutes that legislators have 
enacted. Yet the principal theorists of the economic model cling to procrustean notions of rent 
creation to describe regulation, even when some groups clearly are made worse off, and even when 
those losses outweigh the gains to other groups.”). 
138. See generally id. See also id. at 73 (crediting Roger Beck, Colin Hoskins, and Martin 
Connolly as being the “first to have discussed and systemically tested the competing hypotheses 
concerning rent extraction”). 
139. Id. at 2–3. 
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First, however, we must be sure that this alternative narrative holds 
water. There is considerable evidence that the unwilling donor is a real 
and growing phenomenon; indeed, there are entire books on the 
subject.
140
 Some of this evidence is circumstantial, such as individuals 
and PACs who give generously to both parties, suggesting that 
something beyond ideology may be motivating these donors.
141
 In the 
2013–2014 election cycle, 20,301 donors gave to both Democrats and 
Republicans, with the total donations favoring Republicans fifty-two 
percent to thirty-eight percent.
142
 These trends are more revealing when 
individual and PAC donations are viewed together. For example, 
according to the Center for Responsive Politics, between 1989 and 2014 
the National Association of Realtors PAC and employees spent nearly 
$68 million on political contributions and independent expenditures—
forty-eight percent to Democrats or liberal groups and fifty-two percent 
to Republicans or conservative groups.
143
 For J.P. Morgan Chase over 
the same time period, the split was forty-eight percent Democrat to fifty-
three percent Republican; for AT&T, forty-two percent to fifty-eight 
                                                     
140. See, e.g., SCHWEIZER, supra note 27.  
141. See Top Organization Contributors, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
orgs/list.php (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (listing the top 100 organizational donors, of whom forty-
six gave at least thirty percent of their contributions to the “other” party). This split by corporate 
interests is all the more notable given that most individual big donors do appear to favor one party 
over the other. Compare Totals by Sector, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
bigpicture/sectors.php?cycle=2012&bkdn=DemRep&sortBy=Rank (last visited July 20, 2015) 
(showing a relatively even split between industries over time), with Lee Drutman, The Political 1% 
of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (June 24, 2013, 9:00 AM) 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/ (reporting that in 2012 nearly half 
of the big donors gave ninety percent or more of their contributions to Republicans and roughly a 
third gave more than ninety percent to Democrats). Indeed, under a game theory rubric, some 
studies suggest that an outcome-oriented donor can generally achieve his preferred result through 
donations to only one party. See Chamon & Kaplan, supra note 131. Nevertheless, according to the 
Center for Responsive Politics, in the most recent election cycle more than 20,000 individual donors 
gave to both parties, with more than 7000 donors giving at least thirty-three percent to each 
Democrats and Republicans. Donor Demographics, supra note 9. This is far more than the number 
of donors who “maxed out” in hard money contributions in 2012. In 2012, 2972 donors hit the 
aggregate committee limits and 591 hit the aggregate candidate limits. McCutcheon vs FEC, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/mccutcheon.php (last visited July 21, 
2015). Only 646 donors hit the maximum overall donation limit. Bob Biersack, McCutcheon’s 
Multiplying Effect: Why an Overall Limit Matters, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/mccutcheons-multiplying-effect-why/. 
142. Donor Demographics, supra note 9 (the remaining percentages went to PACs). According to 
Politifact, from 1989–2012 real estate mogul Donald Trump gave $497,690 to Republicans and 
$581,350 to Democrats; it is only in recent years that his contributions have heavily favored 
Republicans. See Cabaniss, supra note 15. 
143. Top Organization Contributors, supra note 141. 
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percent; for Microsoft, fifty-six percent to forty-four percent.
144
 
Others point to large amounts of money donated disproportionately to 
incumbents as evidence that a sense of obligation rather than a robust set 
of policy preferences motivates many donors.
145
 Few with business 
pending before Congress care to risk the ire of a sitting legislator by 
supporting his or her challenger. For example, in the 2012 elections the 
defense industry spent ninety-four percent of its funds supporting the 
incumbent and just one percent supporting a challenger; the finance and 
insurance industry spent eighty-nine percent of its funds supporting an 
incumbent and just two percent supporting a challenger (the remaining 
percentages went to open seats).
146
 The evidence is even starker if one 
looks at how campaign contributions shift as committee membership 
changes. A recent Stanford study found that legislators who lose their 
places on influential committees “experience a sharp drop in 
contributions from PACs overseen by their committee.”147 For example, 
sudden removal from the House Ways and Means Committee resulted in 
a $326,060 drop in PAC contributions.
148
 
Of course, any individual transaction underlying these statistics may 
be explained through the traditional narrative. Perhaps they merely show 
donors expressing their preference for a policy rather than a party, or 
donors truly preferring the sitting official over her challenger. They may 
                                                     
144. Id.  
145. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 2–3; Incumbent Advantage, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/incumbs.php?cycle=2014&type=A&party=A (last visited 
July 21, 2015) (reporting that in 2014 House incumbents raised six times as much as their 
challengers and Senate incumbents raised ten times as much as their challengers); see also MICHAEL 
JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND DEMOCRACY 70–71 (2005) 
(postulating that donors may be skeptical of the donor-legislator relationship but will contribute to 
incumbent campaigns not because they are concerned about “favorable policy,” but because they 
feel obligated, even extorted, by legislative leaders); James M. Snyder, Jr. Campaign Contributions 
as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980–1986, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1195, 1197 
(1990) (arguing that incumbents have more favors to sell because of their historical political 
influence in Washington, so they receive more in donations than do challengers).  
146. PAC Dollars to Incumbents, Challengers, and Open Seat Candidates, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/pac2cands.php?cycle=2012 (last visited July 21, 2015).  
147. Eleanor Neff Powell & Justin Grimmer, Money in Exile: Campaign Contributions and 
Committee Access 25 (Oct. 26, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://stanford.edu/~jgrimmer/money.pdf; see also id. at 17 (“When legislators are exiled from 
broadly influential committees, the largest decrease in contributions comes from PACs that 
represent companies under the purview of the committee.”). This is all the more notable given that 
committee exile generally is correlated with an increase in PAC contributions, presumably to 
forestall the risk of perceived vulnerability at the ballot box. Id. at 15–17 (noting that the increase 
appears to come from PACs with a partisan or electoral focus). 
148. Id. at 18. The authors note by way of comparison that the average House race cost 
approximately $1.2 million in 2012; these reductions are significant. Id. 
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even demonstrate nothing more than blatant access-seeking by 
grasping—and very willing—special interests. Less easy to explain 
away is feedback from wealthy donors themselves. A 2013 poll of 302 
business leaders by the non-partisan Committee for Economic 
Development found that seventy-five percent of respondents reported 
that the U.S. campaign finance system is “pay-to-play,” and sixty-four 
percent believe it is a serious problem.
149
 Eighty-nine percent of 
respondents supported limitations on contributions to candidates and 
political groups—a remarkable figure in light of McCutcheon’s vigorous 
defense of individual donors’ expressive rights.150 
Are these business leaders correct? It is difficult to imagine that so 
many executives would believe the system is “pay-to-play” without 
some indication that is true, but tracking this impact is difficult. Studies 
looking for a correlation between legislator voting patterns and 
contributions have been inconclusive, although as critics have noted, this 
is a very blunt metric.
151
 Much—indeed most—legislative action occurs 
out of the public spotlight before a vote ever occurs, and intangibles 
such as the salience of an issue or the existence of potential (but not yet 
actual) contributors may impact a vote.
152
 A 2014 study attempted to 
                                                     
149. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND 
REFORM (2013) [hereinafter AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND REFORM], 
available at https://www.ced.org/pdf/Campaign_Finance%2C_Hart_and_AmView.pdf (arguing that 
the situation has worsened in the wake of Citizens United); see COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., AFTER 
CITIZENS UNITED: IMPROVING ACCOUNTABILITY IN POLITICAL FINANCE, HIDDEN MONEY: THE 
NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICAL FINANCE, PARTIAL JUSTICE: THE PERIL OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS (2015), available at https://www.ced.org/pdf/moneyinpoliticsexsum_4.pdf (“Current 
fundraising practices promote a pay-to-play mentality that encourages political giving as a means of 
influencing legislative decision-making. The demand for campaign money places pressure on those 
who have particular interests in government policy to make contributions and spend money in 
support of those seeking public office. Prospective donors, particularly members of the business 
community, are encouraged to pursue influence through political giving, which poses the risk of 
long-term national interests being sacrificed for short-term gains. Members of the business 
community also face ‘shake downs’ for political contributions or feel compelled to match—or 
exceed—the amount given by competing interests.”). 
150. AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND REFORM, supra note 149. 
151. See, e.g., Thomas L. Brunell, The Relationship Between Political Parties and Interest 
Groups: Explaining Patterns of PAC Contributions to Candidates for Congress, 58 POL. RES. Q. 
681, 681–88 (2005); Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Congressional Officials Grant Access 
to Individuals Because They Have Contributed to Campaigns: A Randomized Field Study, 00 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 1, 1–3 (2015) (reviewing literature in this area). 
152. See Powell & Grimmer, supra note 147, at 2–3; Chamon & Kaplan, supra note 131, at 1; 
Karen H. Good, Keynote Address from Jack Abramoff: “Don’t Repeat Any of This. No, I’m 
Kidding,” 3 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 345, 346–47 (2012) (giving examples of how promises of money 
from lobbyists influenced policy discussions and agenda setting regarding legislation outside the 
legislative chamber); see also Lynda W. Powell, The Influence of Campaign Contributions on 
Legislative Policy, 11 FORUM 339, 342 (2013) (noting in the context of a state-based study that 
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avoid some of these empirical pitfalls with an experiment. Researchers 
had a political organization contact 191 congressional offices in an 
attempt to arrange a meeting between someone in the congressional 
office and a donor—but they only revealed the individual was a donor in 
certain situations.
153
 The results were unambiguous: “[S]enior 
policymakers attended the meetings considerably more frequently when 
[c]ongressional offices were informed that the meeting attendees were 
donors.”154 The likelihood of attendance increased, in fact, by three to 
four times if the donor was revealed, a result that was “highly unlikely” 
due to chance.
155
 
Of course, it is not necessary that the unwilling donor be correct about 
the nature of political contributions so much as believe himself to be so, 
and thus feel pressured into making contributions in kind or in an 
amount far larger than he would wish. The unwilling donor is often less 
motivated by a desire for a particular legislative action than a fear about 
what might happen if a contribution is not forthcoming.
156
 For this 
donor, a single powerful anecdote about a result achieved or lost may be 
enough, in the prisoner’s dilemma-like matrix of risk analysis that 
donors contemplate, to convince him that a contribution is required.
157
 In 
                                                     
“[w]hile donations can be used to aid the passage of legislation, they are more often given to kill a 
bill quietly,” and quoting Tom Loftus, former Wisconsin state politician, as saying that donations 
mainly “buy the status quo”). 
153. Kalla & Broockman, supra note 151, at 1. 
154. Id. at 9 (“Only 2.4% of offices arranged meetings with a member of Congress or chief of 
staff when they believed the attendees were merely constituents, but 12.5% did so when the 
attendees were revealed to be donors. In addition, 18.8% of the groups revealed to be donors met 
with any senior staffer, while only 5.5% of the groups described as constituents gained access to a 
senior staffer, a more than threefold increase.”). 
155. Id. at 10. 
156. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 125 n.13 (2003) (quoting the declaration of 
Gerald Greenwald of United Airlines: “Business and labor leaders believe, based on their 
experience, that disappointed Members, and their party colleagues, may shun or disfavor them 
because they have not contributed. Equally, these leaders fear that if they refuse to contribute 
(enough), competing interests who do contribute generously will have an advantage in gaining 
access to and influencing key Congressional leaders on matters of importance to the company or 
union”). 
157. Cf. Graham Morehead, The Corporate Campaign Contribution Game, SCILOGS (Oct. 10, 
2011), http://www.scilogs.com/a_mad_hemorrhage/the-corporate-campaign-contribution-game/ (“If 
you are a large corporation, you have a choice: to exert or not exert influence on legislators. If you 
don’t spend money on PACs you can spend it on R&D, or advertising, or employee incentives, or 
anything that’s actually productive. The problem is, how can you trust your competitors to not 
spend money on PACs? You can’t. You are in the prisoner’s dilemma. If neither of you spend 
money on politics you both come out ahead. If only one spends money, the other one will suffer. It’s 
a game that neither party can afford not to play. As long as it’s legal, all large companies are 
compelled to play.”). 
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his book denouncing his previous profession, former lobbyist Jack 
Abramoff recalled an exchange that typifies the type of request an 
unwilling donor might receive: 
In 1995, when Microsoft needed access to the House 
Republican Leadership, conservatives were there to help. When 
the company started to feel the Clinton administration’s pressure 
on the issue of software program encryption export, it was 
Majority Whip Tom DeLay who came to the rescue. . . . DeLay 
expressed his general support for their positions and reminded 
them it was likely to be the Republicans who would defend the 
freedom they required to develop their company. He made a soft 
appeal for political contributions from the company . . . . 
One of the Microsoft executives firmly brushed off his 
solicitation, prompting DeLay to deliver a stern message. When 
he was a freshman in Congress, he told them, he approached 
Walmart for a campaign contribution. The government affairs 
director of Walmart told him that Walmart didn’t like to “sully 
their hands” with political involvement. Staring intently at the 
Microsoft executives, DeLay continued: “A year later that 
government affairs rep was in my office asking me to intervene 
to get an exit built from the federal highway adjacent to a new 
Walmart store. I told him I didn’t want to sully my hands with 
such a task. You know what? They didn’t get their ramp. You 
know what else? They will never get that ramp.” 
DeLay smiled, without taking his eyes off the quivering 
executives. As we would say in the lobbying business: They 
finally got the joke. A $100,000 check was soon delivered to the 
Republican Congressional Committee, and Microsoft’s 
relationship with the American right commenced.
158
 
Consider too that the ban on corporate political contributions (as 
opposed to the ban on corporate independent expenditures, which was 
struck down in Citizens United) remains in place in part because 
virtually no corporation has challenged it.
159
 Relatedly, in the pitched 
                                                     
158. ABRAMOFF, supra note 124, at 64–65. 
159. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012); R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41542, THE 
STATE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 11–13 
(2014). There have been a handful of challenges to BCRA’s corporate contribution ban by not-for-
profit advocacy organizations, see, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), but the only 
challenges of note from for-profit entities have come in attempts to defend against criminal money 
laundering charges, see, e.g., United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding 
corporate contribution ban constitutional as applied to entity that reimbursed employees for 
campaign contributions). Challenges by nonprofit organizations to city and state corporate 
contribution bans have also been rare and largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., Catholic Leadership Coal. 
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legal battle around the constitutionality of BCRA that resulted in 
McConnell, “business parties,” including the Chamber of Commerce and 
the National Association of Manufacturers, filed an action that was 
joined to Senator McConnell’s challenge to the law.160 One of the most 
hotly contested sections of BCRA banned “soft money,” or funds raised 
by candidates and parties outside of federal limits to be used for 
supposedly non-campaign, “party-building,” activities.161 Prior to 
BCRA, corporations could not contribute directly to candidates, but they 
frequently gave large amounts of soft money to the political parties.
162
 In 
McConnell, the business parties argued strenuously for their right to run 
independent “issue ads” discussing candidates by name up to the date of 
the election (challenging the “electioneering communications” section of 
the new law, the issue upon which they would prevail in Citizens 
United).
163
 But they were utterly silent when it came to the soft money 
ban.
164
 There is perhaps no better evidence of the unwilling donor than 
the fact that the most politically active business organization in 
Washington—the Chamber of Commerce—was unwilling to join the 
fight for its right to give, and to be solicited for, direct contributions.
165
 
C. Historical Context 
If one accepts that the unwilling donor exists, the next question one 
might ask is why his interests have not been considered before in 
campaign finance doctrine. There are two answers to this question. One 
draws on historical accounts, and the other looks to more recent events. 
The first answer is that campaign finance laws have in fact 
                                                     
of Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 443 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting challenge by a nonprofit 
corporation to a state law prohibiting, inter alia, corporate campaign contributions); Iowa Right to 
Life Comm. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1787 
(2014) (same).  
160. See generally McConnell, 540 U.S. 93; Brief of Appellants, “Business Plaintiffs,” Chamber 
of Commerce of the U.S. et al., McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (No. 02-1756) [hereinafter McConnell 
Business Plaintiffs’ Brief]. 
161. See 2 U.S.C § 431 (2012); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 94. 
162. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122–32; see also supra note 75 (detailing soft money rise). 
163. McConnell Business Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 160, at 11–44.  
164. Compare McConnell Business Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 160, with Reply Brief of 
Appellant, Mitch McConnell, McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (No. 02-1756). 
165. See David Steinbach, Million Dollar Baby: U.S. Chamber Is First to Hit Lobbying 
Milestone, OPENSECRETS.ORG (July 23, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/07/billion-
dollar-baby-us-chamber-is-first-to-hit-lobbying-milestone/; Lobbying, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=s (last visited Dec. 10, 2015) (presenting 
research that from 1998 to 2015, the Chamber of Commerce outspent the next highest spender on 
lobbying (the American Medical Association) $1,160,065,680 to $326,122,500). 
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accommodated concerns about the unwilling donor in the past. Indeed, 
these concerns were present at the genesis of modern campaign finance 
regulation, the 1907 Tillman Act.
166
 As Robert Sitkoff has outlined in 
detail, the 1907 Act, which prohibited corporations from making direct 
political contributions (a ban that still stands), followed a decade in 
which the “national political parties for the first time deployed 
sophisticated and systematic procedures for demanding contributions for 
their candidates from corporations in particular.”167 It was not necessary 
for these “demands,” which many business leaders viewed as outright 
extortion, to link directly to a specific political act; these were payments 
not akin to bribery so much as to protection money.
168
 Newspapers at the 
time reported that Wall Street firms were advised what level of 
contribution was expected from them, an amount that was directly 
pegged to the firm’s profitability.169 If payment was not made in the 
form of campaign contributions, there were implied consequences.
170
 
Sitkoff points to contemporary evidence to support his contention that 
early campaign finance reform efforts were motivated not just by fear 
that private interests were seeking to corrupt the public process, but by 
concerns that federal candidates and the national parties were over-
reaching.
171
 If corporations (or their executives) today are silent when it 
comes to asserting their First Amendment right to contribute, they were 
                                                     
166. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). Concerns about the potential of the federal 
government to wield overly coercive power date back to America’s foundation. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison); see also ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 32–
80 (2014) (arguing that concerns about preventing systemic government corruption and undue 
influence informed the Founding Fathers and underlie the Constitution). 
167. Sitkoff, supra note 31, at 1132. 
168. See id. at 1136; Hasen, supra note 31, at 204–07. 
169. Sitkoff, supra note 31, at 1132. 
170. Sitkoff quotes from a contemporaneous New York Times article about how an executive 
might have viewed a visit from the head of the Republican National Committee (and former 
Secretary of Commerce and Labor) George Cortelyou, particularly if the executive worked in a 
business, such as banking or insurance, that fell under the oversight of Commerce: 
Chairman Cortelyou goes to one of the officers of a large corporation and informs him that the 
Republican National Committee expects a substantial contribution from his company. The 
officer in question is surprised; he is not of Mr. Roosevelt’s party, neither he nor his 
corporation has been accustomed to meddle with politics; he asks for time to think it over. In 
the solitude of his office his thoughts run in this wise: I do not want to give money to the 
Republican National Committee. But I am trustee of the interests of the stockholders of this 
corporation. I may soon have to appear before this man as a representative of my corporation in 
a matter affecting its business, as to which he will have, if not official discretion, at least very 
great personal and official influence, which I would dislike to have used against me. I cannot 
let my personal disinclinations stand in the way of the company’s interests. I will make this 
forced contribution to Mr. Cortelyou’s fund. 
Id. at 1134 (quoting To Bar Corporation Cash in Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1907, at 1). 
171. Id. at 1131–39. 
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jubilant following the passage of the Tillman Act. Even though the Act 
quite obviously burdened corporate speech, it received enthusiastic 
support from the very community whose “rights” it was impeding. 
“Indeed,” Sitkoff notes, “consider this reaction of a ‘great financial 
authority’ to the Senate’s passage of the statute, which was reported in a 
[New York Times] editorial entitled Happy Corporations: ‘[We] welcome 
[] this legislation with very much the same emotions with which a serf 
would his liberation from a tyrannous autocrat.’”172 Similarly coercive 
behavior preceded and helped precipitate the 1939 Hatch Act, which 
prohibits federal contractors from making contributions for any political 
purpose,
173
 and it is possible that similar concerns emerged prior to the 
1947 Taft-Hartley Act’s174 ban on direct union contributions.175 
A more current answer to the question of why the interests of the 
unwilling donor do not appear in modern campaign finance 
jurisprudence—and, perhaps, why legal scholarship has scarcely 
addressed the subject
176—requires a brief review of how advocacy has 
                                                     
172. Id. at 1136 (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted); cf. Richard Epstein, 
Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right That Big Corporations Should Have but Do Not 
Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 653–54 (2011) (arguing that the right of corporations to 
donate directly to candidate’s campaign remains a reform no executive wants). 
173. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1508 (2012). The ban was recently challenged and upheld 
in federal court. See Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed sub 
nom. Miller v. FEC, No. 15-428, 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3550 (Oct. 2, 2014); Oral 
Argument, Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013), available at http://www.c-
span.org/video/?321777-1/wagner-v-fec-oral-argument. The government’s brief in Wagner 
describes this history: 
[A]buses [in the 1936 and 1938 elections] included requiring “destitute women on sewing 
projects . . . to disgorge” part of their wages as political tribute or be fired, and requiring WPA 
workers to make political contributions by depositing $3-$5 from their $30 monthly pay under 
the Democratic donkey paperweight on the supervisor’s desk. Of particular prominence in 
congressional debates regarding the Hatch Act was the Democratic “campaign-book racket,” in 
which a government contractor was required to buy campaign books—“the number varying in 
proportion to the amount of Government business he had enjoyed”—at exorbitant prices in 
order to assure future opportunities for government business. The scheme also coerced 
government contractors to buy advertising space: “[I]t was either take the space or be 
blacklisted.”  
Brief of Appellee at 8, Wagner, 717 F.3d 1007 (No. 13-5162) (citations to record omitted). 
174. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2012)). 
175. See Joseph E. Kallenbach, The Taft-Hartley Act and Union Political Contributions and 
Expenditures, 33 MINN. L. REV. 1, 20 (1948) (noting that union leaders had expressed far less 
concern about the Act’s ban on direct contributions than its ban on independent expenditures). 
176. In addition to the events described in this section, another likely reason for the lack of 
scholarship in this area is because until Citizens United and now McCutcheon, the compelling 
government interests against which one evaluated campaign finance legislation extended past quid 
pro quo bribery to examples of access and influence that accommodated, albeit tacitly, the unwilling 
donor’s interests. See supra notes 68–79 and accompanying text. 
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changed in Washington, D.C. since FECA was enacted. The Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area has not kept up with the times. In the decades 
since Buckley laid out the paradigm of the rent-seeking contributor, 
Washington has witnessed several trends that have elevated the roles of 
both the elected official and campaign contributions. 
The first trend is a dramatic increase in federal lobbying. Lee 
Drutman reports that “[i]n 2009, politically active organizations reported 
$3.47 billion on direct lobbying expenses, up from $1.44 billion reported 
just ten years prior, and, controlling for inflation, almost seven times the 
estimated $200 million in lobbying expenses in 1983.”177 Drutman 
estimates that the actual amount spent on lobbying is at least twice what 
is reported, while some experts put the figure as high as $9 billion in 
2013.
178
 The dramatic rise in earnings for lobbyists reflects an equally 
dramatic increase in the number of corporations seeking their services 
and opening their own government relations departments in 
Washington.
179
 There are any number of theories for why lobbying has 
increased so dramatically over the last several decades, from the 
protective—a concern that a particular government regulation could 
impact one’s business—to the proactive—a savvy investment in 
securing a tax extender, earmark, or other government favor
180—but for 
present purposes, the salient fact is the increased engagement of 
Washington by corporate America and other special interests.
181
 
The second trend is the professionalization of the lobbying industry. 
As Larry Lessig notes in Republic, Lost, whereas once lobbyists may 
                                                     
177. Lee Drutman, The Business of America Is Lobbying: Explaining the Growth of Corporate 
Political Activity in Washington, DC 1 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
California, Berkeley), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi= 
10.1.1.519.3212&rep=rep1&type=pdf; see also Robert G. Kaiser, The Power Player; How the Rise 
of One Lobbying Firm Helped Transform the Way Washington Works, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2007, 
at A1 (reporting that “in 1975, the total revenue of Washington lobbyists was less than $100 million 
a year. In 2006 the fees paid to registered lobbyists surpassed $2.5 billion”). 
178. Lee Fang, Where Have All the Lobbyists Gone?, THE NATION (Feb. 19, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/178460/shadow-lobbying-complex#; see also LEE DRUTMAN, THE 
BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS 
BECAME MORE CORPORATE 9 (2015) (citing Tim LaPira, How Much Lobbying Is There in 
Washington? It’s Double What You Think, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Nov. 25, 2013, 1:27 PM), 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/11/25/how-much-lobbying-is-there-in-washington-its-
double-what-you-think/). 
179. Drutman, supra note 177, at 31. 
180. One University of Kansas study found that the return on investment for firms lobbying for 
the tax holiday on repatriated earnings created by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 was 
more than $220 for every $1 spent—a 22,000 percent return. Alexander, Mazza & Scholz, supra 
note 131. 
181. See Drutman, supra note 177, at 1. 
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have sought results through techniques best described as “grotesque”—
think paper bags of money and even more unsavory bribes—today’s 
lobbyists are, with perhaps a few exceptions, well-educated professional 
policy “wonks,” often with years of subject matter expertise.182 In the 
last 150 years, lobbying has gone from being an arrangement 
presumptively void on public policy grounds to a profession with a 
constitutional pedigree.
183
 
This rise in size and stature by those seeking to influence government 
action has changed the norms in Washington. It has eroded the tacit 
barrier that existed between lobbyists and elected officials. A 2007 
article in The Washington Post observed that while “[i]n 1975 the rare 
hiring of a former member of Congress as a lobbyist made eyebrows 
rise[,] [t]oday 200 former members of the House and Senate are 
registered lobbyists.”184 In 2015 that number is 427.185 Similarly, in the 
1980s and 90s, older federal lawmakers “balked” at the idea of soliciting 
funds from an industry that they regulated.
186
 Today, it is business as 
usual.
187
 As the culture of money and influence became more regulated 
and conventional, it became more systemic and accepted. 
Lee Drutman tries to understand the “puzzle” of why business 
political activity continued to increase in Washington in the 1980s and 
1990s even as the immediate threat to business interests (e.g., taxes, 
                                                     
182. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS AND A PLAN TO 
STOP IT 101–04 (2011); see Fang, supra note 178. 
183. Compare Zephyr Teachout, The Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 4, 7–12 
(2014) (challenging the modern view that the First Amendment was intended to protect lobbying 
activities and quoting Marshall v. Baltimore Ohio Railroad Co., 57 U.S. 314 (1853), Tool Co. v. 
Norris, 69 U.S. 45, 56 (1864), and Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441 (1874), early Supreme Court cases in 
which the Court held lobbying contracts void on public policy grounds), with Nicholas W. Allard, 
Lobbying Is an Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the Competition to Be Right, 19 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 40 (2008) (reviewing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on lobbying, 
and arguing that more recently the Court took a “notable step” to recognize a constitutional right to 
engage in the lobbying profession). 
184. Kaiser, supra note 177. 
185. Former Members, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/ 
top.php?display=Z (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
186. LESSIG, supra note 182, at 99–100 (relating, inter alia, a 1982 conversation in which Senator 
John Stennis, then chairman of the Armed Services Committee, “was asked by a colleague to hold a 
fund-raiser at which defense contractors would be present[.] Stennis balked. Said Stennis: ‘Would 
that be proper? I hold life and death over these companies. I don’t think it would be proper for me to 
take money from them’”); see also TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 128, at 91 (quoting former Rep. 
Dan Boren as making a similar observation). 
187. See Keenan Steiner & Anupama Narayanswamy, OCE Report on Financial Reform Shows 
Nexus Between Fundraising and Legislating, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2011, 2:41 PM), 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/02/07/oce-report/ (noting occasions where lawmakers 
attended fundraisers within hours of voting on bills relevant to attendees). 
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regulations) diminished. He posits that “the growth of corporate 
lobbying is a result of a path-dependent learning process” in which 
lobbyists discovered opportunities for companies in the federal 
government and corporate managers over time grew more comfortable 
with lobbying.
188
 Following the approach that Professor McChesney 
took in understanding regulatory theory,
189
 I would add a gloss to this 
narrative, widening the frame on the cycle of dependence to include the 
political figures who benefited over the years from increased campaign 
contributions and in time came to rely upon them. There is significant 
evidence that money raised by candidates has become necessary both to 
maintain their position in a fundraising “arms race” against challengers 
and to maintain their lifestyles.
190
 
                                                     
188. Drutman, supra note 177, at 2; see also Kaiser, supra note 177 (charting the exploitation of 
the earmarking process through the 1980s and 1990s). 
189. MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 46–50. 
190. Although the McCutcheon plurality appeared to assume that campaign contributions all go 
toward expressive advocacy and electoral expenses, this is far from reality. While political 
contributions cannot be spent to buy, for example, a house or car for personal use, expenses such as 
a new wardrobe, trips to exclusive resorts, and dinners at the nicest restaurants in town can all be 
written off as campaigning or fundraising expenses or reimbursed from a leadership PAC. Marcus 
Stern & Jennifer LaFleur, Leadership PACs: Let the Good Times Roll, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 26, 
2009, 10:32 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/leadership-pacs-let-the-good-times-roll-925. 
The use of Leadership PAC funds, which are subject to less stringent restrictions than candidates’ 
campaign accounts, is particularly revealing. See Steve Kroft, Washington’s Open Secret: Profitable 
PACs, CBS NEWS (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/washingtons-open-secret-
profitable-pacs/. While some excessive expenditures do attract censure, as in the case of former 
Congressman Aaron Schock, who had his congressional office decorated in the style of the 
aristocratic British drama “Downton Abbey,” or Senator Robert Menendez, who accepted lavish 
gifts and trips from a donor, these cases are perhaps most notable in the underlying culture they 
reveal. See Jake Sherman et al., Schock Resigns, POLITICO (Mar. 17, 2015, 2:08 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/aaron-schock-resigns-116153.html; Matt Apuzzo, U.S. 
Charges Menendez Sold Political Favors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2015, at A1. Consider, for example, 
former House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, who lost his primary in an upset in 2014. As 
incredulous media outlets noted, Cantor’s campaign spent more on dinners at steakhouses than his 
opponent, David Brat, spent on the entirety of his campaign. Joan E. Greve & Jack Linshi, Cantor 
Spent More on Steakhouses than the Guy Who Beat Him Spent on His Whole Campaign, TIME (June 
11, 2014), http://time.com/2857694/eric-cantor-dave-brat-spending/. A breakdown of the 
campaign’s spending showed that the steakhouse dinners also topped the amount the campaign 
committee spent on “strategy and research,” and yet they were only a small percentage of the 
considerable “fundraising” costs the campaign expensed. Id. Eric Cantor also had a Leadership 
PAC, the Every Republican Is Crucial PAC, which could accept donations higher than those that 
could go directly to his campaign and was meant to allow him to support other like-minded 
candidates. In the 2012 election cycle, Cantor’s Leadership PAC raised $5,506,748 and spent 
$5,373,750, yet only donated $2,086,000 to other candidates. Every Republican Is Crucial PAC, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00384701&cycle 
=2012 (last visited July 21, 2015). Campaign and PAC funds can also be used to hire outside 
consultants, which not infrequently include family members. Kroft, supra (statement of Melanie 
Sloan, noting that there are at least seventy-five Members of Congress who employ family members 
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Indeed, two of the most recent anti-corruption initiatives on Capitol 
Hill have served to further enhance the position of elected officials and 
the centrality of campaign contributions. The first is the passage of the 
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA),
191
 
which instituted systemic and ambitious lobbying reforms in the wake of 
the Jack Abramoff scandal.
192
 Until HLOGA, lobbyists were subject to 
strict disclosure requirements, but lobbying was otherwise largely 
unrestricted, constrained only by internal House and Senate ethics 
guidelines and criminal bribery and gift statutes.
193
 Offers of gifts and 
trips to politicians from those seeking political favor were common.
194
 
HLOGA was meant to end the culture of graft, with an outright ban on 
gifts
195—including, for the most part, meals196—from registered 
lobbyists, and a $100 annual limit on gifts from other sources.
197
 Most 
                                                     
within their campaigns). In extreme instances, certain Members have even loaned money to their 
campaigns at a high rate of interest and have collected money annually from their campaign. Id. 
(reporting at least fifteen cases of Members loaning themselves money from their campaign funds; 
the most severe being Congresswoman Grace Napolitano, who loaned her campaign $150,000, and, 
with eighteen percent interest, collected $228,000 twelve years later).  
191. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735 
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012)). 
192. 2 U.S.C. § 1601. Jack Abramoff was convicted of multiple violations of bribery, extortion, 
and lobbying laws, most notably for charging an extra $85 million in lobbying fees to a casino for 
his personal gain and giving large amounts of money and gifts to Members of Congress in direct 
exchange for legislative action. See ABRAMOFF, supra note 124. 
193. JACOB R. STRAUSS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40245, LOBBYING REGISTRATION AND 
DISCLOSURE: BEFORE AND AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE HONEST LEADERSHIP AND OPEN 
GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2007, at 3–5 (2011). 
194. See Good, supra note 152, at 354–55. Abramoff, now a government reform advocate, has 
estimated that ninety-nine percent of the activities in which he engaged while a lobbyist were legal. 
Emily Tess Katz, Jack Abramoff: Supreme Court Justices ‘Just Don’t Get’ How Money Influences 
Politics, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/04/17/jack-abramoff-supreme-court-campaign-finance_n_5169510.html. 
195. 2 U.S.C. § 1613(a); see also STRAUSS, supra note 193. 
196. 2 U.S.C. § 1613(a); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 110TH 
CONG., HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 27–28 (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL] 
(noting that, prior to HLOGA and other legislation, food and drink were excluded from the Gift 
Rule); S. COMM. ON ETHICS, THE SENATE CODE OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT 3 (2008) [hereinafter 
SENATE CODE OF CONDUCT], available at http://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/ 
serve?File_id=efa7bf74-4a50-46a5-bb6f-b8d26b9755bf (defining meals as “gifts” within the 
meaning of HLOGA). 
197. 2 U.S.C. § 1613(a). No single gift can exceed fifty dollars. KAREN L. HAAS, 114TH CONG., 
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 42 (2015), available at 
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf (allowing the acceptance of small gifts by 
members of the House of Representatives); SENATE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 196 (allowing 
the acceptance of small gifts by Senators). These rules are subject to a number of exceptions for, for 
example, personal friendship. Gifts Given on the Basis of Personal Friendship, HOUSE ETHICS 
MANUAL, supra note 196, 41–42; id. at 40 n.98 (restricting gifts from friends, spouses, or other 
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crucially, the only money that is now acceptable at all from registered 
lobbyists, and that may be given over the strict cap from other sources, is 
campaign contributions.
198
 The relationship between lobbying and 
campaign contributions has thus been formalized and sanctioned. The 
result has been to move elected officials into the driver’s seat and to 
amplify the role of campaign contributions for those whose interests may 
fall under the purview of Congress. Whereas once those seeking 
government assistance may have offered to take a lawmaker to dinner or 
to a ballgame, now it is the lawmaker who does the asking, inviting big 
spenders to fundraisers at the venue of her choice and asking for 
perfectly legal contributions to her campaign, PAC, leadership PAC, and 
party committee—all of which help an elected official gain or maintain 
his or her status within the party.
199
 
Second, following the 2010 election, House Members acted to 
eliminate earmarks from spending bills.
200
 Some of these earmarks, such 
as the infamous “Bridge to Nowhere,” deserved censure as examples of 
government waste and undue influence by special interests.
201
 For all 
their faults, however, earmarks greased the legislative wheels.
202
 In their 
                                                     
connections only if they are given in the capacity of the Member’s work in Congress). 
198. 2 U.S.C. § 1613; see Robert Pear, Ethics Law Isn’t Without Its Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/washington/20lobby.html?pagewanted=all (“‘If we 
call it a campaign contribution, that makes it legal,’ Mr. Breaux said. ‘I can’t buy a $20 breakfast 
for a senator whom I’ve known for years, but I can give him a $1,000 campaign contribution.’” 
(quoting former Senator John B. Breaux)); see also TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 128, at 91 
(suggesting that the “personal discomfort Members feel with asking others—that is, constituents 
who are not lobbyists—[for campaign contributions] might actually make them more likely to stick 
with fundraising from lobbyists”). 
199. See Shane Goldmacher, Why Nearly Everyone in Congress Has a Leadership PAC These 
Days, THE WIRE (July 22, 2013), http://www.thewire.com/politics/2013/07/why-nearly-everyone-
congress-has-leadership-pac-these-days/67450/; see also Newmyer, supra note 21 (describing 
Senator McConnell’s fundraising strategy: “They invited Republican lobbyists to dinner with 
McConnell in a private room at Carmine’s, a family-style Italian restaurant in downtown 
Washington, with no apparent price of admission. But after spaghetti and meatballs, McConnell 
thanked everyone for coming, told them he needed them to contribute the maximum allowable in 
personal money ($30,800 in 2012) to the National Republican Senatorial Committee, and then sat 
back and waited. What followed was a long, pained silence, one of McConnell’s preferred 
negotiating tools. Then, one after another, attendees acquiesced. Organizers called these ‘the 
sandbag dinners’”); SCHWEIZER, supra note 27, at 151 (2013) (telling a similar anecdote of Harry 
Reid’s fundraisers at a D.C. steakhouse). 
200. See Earmark Elimination Act of 2011, H.R. 3707, 112th Cong. (2011). 
201. Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2011, H.R. 662, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Gus 
Lubin, 25 Scandalous Examples of Government Pork That Will Drive You Crazy, BUS. INSIDER 
(Apr. 14, 2010, 2:25 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-worst-pork-of-2010-2010-4?op=1. 
202. See Steven C. LaTourette, The Congressional Earmark Ban: The Real Bridge to Nowhere, 
ROLL CALL (July 30, 2014, 2:59 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/ 
the_congressional_earmark_ban_the_real_bridge_to_nowhere_commentary-235380-1.html 
 
12 - Mueller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:08 PM 
2015] THE UNWILLING DONOR 1827 
 
absence, legislators’ ability to negotiate with each other has been 
curtailed.
203
 Elected officials can no longer swap support for pet projects 
meant to benefit their constituents. Instead, much of the leverage 
Members now have to swing votes their way comes in their ability to 
direct political money to their colleagues in the form of a contribution 
from candidate or leadership PACs—the conferral of a private benefit 
(both in increased electoral competiveness and lifestyle enhancements) 
that elevates, again, the role of the leadership and of campaign 
contributions.
204
 
It may well be that today’s unwilling donor is the heir apparent to 
yesterday’s quite complicit donor, finding himself, like the Sorcerer’s 
Apprentice, the victim of a situation of his own making.
205
 But campaign 
finance doctrine is a constitutional, not karmic, inquiry. The discussion 
below considers how to best address the reality of the unwilling donor. 
III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS 
Now that we have identified the problem of the unwilling donor, what 
can be done to address it? The options quickly narrow to the campaign 
finance system itself. An individual unwilling donor is unlikely to find a 
workable remedy in existing criminal or constitutional law. Campaign 
finance legislation, however, was designed to address not only acts of 
individual malfeasance, but also—indeed, primarily—issues of systemic 
coercion; it is quintessential structural reform. In that framework, the 
interests of the donor who does not wish to donate, or who wishes to 
donate only a moderate amount, must be considered. 
This Part briefly examines and rejects options for the unwilling donor 
                                                     
(“Whether the Pollyanna opponents of the earmark process want to admit it or not, the truth is that 
earmarks were an incredibly important tool in the legislative bargaining process.”). 
203. Burgess Everett, Harry Reid Embraces Earmarks, POLITICO (May 6, 2014, 3:54 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/harry-reid-earmarks-106406.html (explaining how the 
earmark ban makes it more difficult for senior Members to persuade Members on the fence because 
they can no longer offer earmark spending for individual districts as an incentive).  
204. See supra note 127. It appears that many members of Congress also leverage leadership 
PAC money into campaign cash by trading contributions with other candidates. See Viveca Novak 
& John Sugden, Straw into Gold: Candidates Trading Leadership PAC Dollars for Campaign 
Cash, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/10/straw-into-
gold-candidates-trading-leadership-pac-dollars-for-campaign-cash/; Eleanor Neff Powell, Dollars to 
Votes: The Influence of Fundraising in Congress, (Aug. 19 2012), 
http://www.eleanorneffpowell.com/uploads/8/3/9/3/8393347/powell_-_apsa_2012.pdf (finding “[a] 
strong relationship between fundraising assistance and subsequent legislative voting behavior”). 
205. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, DER ZAUBERLEHRLING [THE SORCERER’S APPRENTICE] 
(Edwin Zeydel trans. 1955) (1779), available at http://germanstories.vcu.edu/goethe/ 
zauber_e3.html.  
12 - Mueller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:08 PM 
1828 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1783 
 
to assert his interests from outside the campaign finance framework, 
arriving at the conclusion that his rights are best vindicated through 
campaign finance laws. It then considers how recognizing the unwilling 
donor might alter existing campaign finance doctrine and suggests how 
this might have affected the approach the plurality took in McCutcheon 
had it been raised in that case. 
A. Affirming the Continued Need for Campaign Finance Restrictions 
The unwilling donor problem provides a response to intimations from 
certain Justices and commentators that campaign finance laws are no 
more than redundant legal gloss on top of existing prohibitions and 
protections against corrupt activities.
206
 Upon considering what remedy 
the law might offer an unwilling donor, one discovers that outside the 
framework of campaign finance laws and regulations, the options are 
scant and improbable. This is in part due to the Supreme Court’s narrow 
view of extortion in the campaign finance context and to legal and 
practical challenges in converting an unwilling donor’s interest in non-
expression into a cause of action. More fundamentally, however, it is 
due to the forces that create the pressure that impels the unwilling donor, 
which individual lawsuits cannot address. 
We can start with contemplating what may appear the most logical 
cause of action an unwilling donor might bring or seek to initiate: a 
lawsuit or prosecution for extortion under existing anti-corruption 
laws.
207
 If an unwilling donor is using campaign contributions to pay 
something akin to “protection money” to a candidate, the argument runs, 
he should have recourse through laws designed to protect against 
shakedowns.
208
 
                                                     
206. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 269–71 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Hasen, supra note 24; see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 
1434, 1462 (2014) (plurality opinion) (describing campaign finance restrictions as taking a 
“prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach”). 
207. In addition to the federal Hobbs Act, infra note 210, every state has a law criminalizing 
extortion. See Penalties for Violations of State Ethics and Public Corruption Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF 
ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-criminal-
penalties-for-public-corr.aspx. In some states, extortion by a public official may be pled as a civil 
action tort, but only if there is proof of damages, a difficult hurdle given that campaign 
contributions can easily be refunded. Compare Bass v. Morgan, 516 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987), with Fuhrman v. Cal. Satellite Sys., 231 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Notwithstanding the different burdens of proof between civil and criminal extortion cases, the 
distinction between these types of actions is unlikely to be relevant to the unwilling donor for 
reasons discussed in this section, and this Article does not dwell on it. 
208. See SCHWEIZER, supra note 27, at 18–20.  
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There are a number of obstacles to such an action, however. First, in 
cases in which the money changing hands is a campaign contribution, 
most courts will decline to convict in the absence of an explicit quid pro 
quo.
209
 The Supreme Court read this requirement into the Hobbs Act,
210
 
the federal extortion statute, in the 1991 case McCormick v. United 
States.
211
 During his 1984 re-election campaign, Robert McCormick, a 
West Virginian legislator, had a conversation with a lobbyist whose 
clients he had previously helped and who hoped to have him sponsor a 
bill in the 1985 legislative session.
212
 McCormick noted the high costs of 
his campaign and observed that he had not yet “heard” from the 
lobbyist’s clients.213 He received several cash payments afterwards from 
both lobbyist and clients in the form of envelopes stuffed with $100 
bills, none of which he reported, either as campaign contributions or 
income for tax purposes.
214
 A jury convicted, and the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed, applying a seven-factor test to determine that 
the payments were not legitimate campaign contributions.
215
 In reversing 
and remanding, the Supreme Court held that the solicitation of campaign 
contributions could only violate the Hobbs Act if either “induced by the 
use of force, violence or fear,” or “if the payments are made in return for 
an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to 
perform an official act.”216 
                                                     
209. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. McGregor, 
879 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Ala. 2012). 
210. Hobbs Act, ch. 537, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012)). 
211. Id.; McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). The Court read a similar requirement 
into the federal illegal gratuities statute, under which courts did not formerly require a prosecutor to 
prove a specific quid pro quo, in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398 (1999), 
overturning the conviction of former Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) 
(2012) (prohibiting, inter alia, asking for or giving a thing of value “for or because of any official 
act performed or to be performed by” a public official); Valdes v. United States, 437 F.3d 1276 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that only an act that falls within an officer’s official duties is covered by 
the statute).  
212. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 260. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. United States v. McCormick, 896 F.2d 61, 67 (4th Cir. 1990). 
216. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273. Because the jury had been instructed that “voluntary” 
payments must be given with no expectation of benefit notwithstanding the fact that elected officials 
regularly “act for the benefit of constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some of 
their constituents, shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from 
those beneficiaries,” the Court reversed. Id. at 272, 276. The dissenting Justices would have found 
the jury instructions adequate and that the issue had not been properly preserved for appeal. See id. 
at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that jury instructions properly focused on the parties’ intent 
at the time the contribution was made). 
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A year later, in Evans v. United States,
217
 the Court clarified that an 
“explicit” agreement to engage in a quid pro quo transaction need not be 
spoken.
218
 In Justice Kennedy’s concurrence he explained that the quid 
pro quo exchange need not be stated expressly, “for otherwise the law’s 
effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods. The inducement 
from the official is criminal if it is express or if it is implied from his 
words and actions, so long as he intends it to be so and the payor so 
interprets it.”219 Courts have struggled to reconcile these rulings, but 
most have concluded that an extortion charge based on the provision of 
campaign contributions cannot stand without a clear exchange for value; 
that is, a quid pro quo.
220
 
On the one hand, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Hobbs Act 
prevents anti-corruption statutes from sweeping into their ambit the very 
kind of constituent services a donor might legitimately expect from an 
elected official, in effect penalizing the official for our system of 
privately-financed elections.
221
 On the other hand, the Court’s position 
significantly undermines any assertion that individual criminal statutes 
offer adequate alternatives to the campaign finance system. This is 
particularly clear from the vantage of the unwilling donor. If one 
assumes that corruption looks something “akin to bribery” or rent-
seeking, then a quid pro quo requirement may make sense, or at least 
comport with one’s understanding of the underlying crime.222 If one is 
concerned with something akin to extortion or rent extraction, however, 
the quid pro quo requirement read into the federal statutes by the 
Supreme Court offers a superficially reassuring parallelism that lacks in 
substance.
223
 Neither the Hobbs Act nor the vast majority of state 
                                                     
217. 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 274. 
220. See Alschuler, supra note 96, at 461; Lauren Garcia, Note, Curbing Corruption or 
Campaign Contributions? The Ambiguous Prosecution of “Implicit” Quid Pro Quos Under the 
Federal Funds Bribery Statute, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 229, 237–39 (2012).  
221. The Court may soon say more on this subject. As this Article was being prepared for 
publication, attorneys for former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell, see infra note 237, filed a 
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court asking, inter alia, whether “official action” under the 
Hobbs Act is “limited to exercising actual governmental power, threatening to exercise such power, 
or pressuring others to exercise such power, and whether the jury must be so instructed.” Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1 (2015) (No. 15A218). 
222. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see 
also Teachout, supra note 118, at 33 (noting that quid pro quo is not a requirement in a number of 
bribery statutes). 
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012); id. § 201(c); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 
398 (1999); Evans, 504 U.S. 255; McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
12 - Mueller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:08 PM 
2015] THE UNWILLING DONOR 1831 
 
extortion statues requires an actual exchange; the focus is on whether a 
thing of value (i.e., a contribution) is obtained through coercion, threats, 
abuse of one’s official position, or other improper means, not whether a 
particular thing is actually provided or promised in return.
224
 More to the 
point for the present inquiry, if the unwilling donor gives not to secure a 
specific action but rather to forestall displeasure or avoid legislative 
attention—to receive, in effect, nothing for something—anti-corruption 
statutes that require a quid pro quo are of no recourse. 
There are other, more practical, problems with a hypothetical 
extortion action. It would, for example, be subject to prosecutorial 
discretion.
225
 Prosecutors rarely bring such actions against federal 
elected officials, likely because the prosecutions are time-consuming, 
expensive, and difficult to win because of questions of intent, proof, and 
motive.
226
 To take two recent examples, the high-profile investigations 
of Senator Ted Stevens and Congressman Don Young resulted in 
acquittal (Stevens) and the close of the investigation without charges 
(Young).
227
 In addition, a conviction, even if achieved, is inadequate as a 
                                                     
224. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (“The term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of property from another, with 
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color 
of official right.”); see also Kristal S. Stippich, Behind the Words: Interpreting the Hobbs Act 
Requirement of “Obtaining of Property from Another,” 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 295 (2003) 
(arguing that to the extent extortion is a specific intent crime under the Hobbs Act, the relevant 
inquiry should be on whether the extorter intended to obtain a thing of value unlawfully, not 
whether the parties intended a specific exchange). 
225. Cf. Craig Holman, The Tension Between Lobbying and Campaign Finance, 13 ELECTION 
L.J. 45, 52 (2014) (“The congressional offices have referred to the U.S. Attorney’s office 11,906 
instances of noncompliance with LDA reporting requirements. . . . Yet, Justice Department has 
brought enforcement settlements in only a half-dozen cases in the nearly 18-year history of the 
lobbying law. To date, only one court action to enforce LDA has ever been filed by the Justice 
Department, a civil enforcement suit against Biassi Business Services Inc. in 2013 for chronic 
violations of the law.” (citation omitted)).  
226. Although the Department of Justice Public Integrity Unit charged slightly over 9000 Federal 
officials between 2004 and 2013, few cases involved elected officials. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION 
FOR 2013, at 20 (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin/docs/2013-Annual-
Report.pdf. For example, in 2013, of the 315 convicted federal officials, Justice secured a 
conviction in only one case involving an elected federal official (Congressman Richard G. Renzi), a 
case that did not involve campaign contributions. Id.  
227. See Paul Kaine, House Ethics Committee Fines Don Young, WASH. POST (June 20, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/06/20/house-ethics-committee-fines-
don-young/ (noting despite a four year investigation by the FBI into inappropriate activity between 
Young and energy companies, the only result was a fine by the Ethics Committee); Terry Frieden et 
al., Lawyer Says Prosecutors’ Request Has ‘Cleared’ Stevens, CNN (Apr. 1, 2009, 9:18 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/01/stevens.case.dropped/index.html (explaining Stevens 
was charged and convicted of receiving “hundreds of thousands of dollars of freebies” from 
corporations, but the conviction was overturned because the prosecution withheld information 
beneficial to the defense). Likewise, although former Congressman Michael Grimm was 
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matter of public policy. Prosecutions happen long after the fact, and 
even if corruption is proved, unwinding the damage is not a simple 
matter; laws passed are not easily retracted, and money spent unlikely to 
be returned.
228
 
These objections demonstrate the unlikelihood of a prosecution 
vindicating the interests of an unwilling donor, but there is another, more 
fundamental reason that the availability of such actions provides an 
inadequate remedy. An action for extortion in the campaign finance 
context would re-frame an interest in having control over one’s 
participation in the process of electing our public leaders—an interest of 
constitutional proportion—as no more than a statutory violation by an 
individual politician.
229
 
Does this mean that the Constitution provides a cause of action for an 
unwilling donor? The Supreme Court has recognized that the First 
Amendment protects not only one’s right to speak, but also one’s right to 
refuse to speak or to be coerced into speaking.
230
 For the purposes of this 
discussion, I assume that a right to speak in a political campaign 
encompasses a corresponding right not to speak.
231
 Certainly the 
                                                     
investigated for campaign finance irregularities, his guilty plea and sentencing in 2015 related to 
one count of tax evasion in outside business dealings. See Stephanie Clifford, Former New York 
Congressman Is Sentenced to 8 Months, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2015 at A15. 
228. MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 21 (noting the “extralegal” nature of rent-seeking and other 
exchanges between private individuals and legislators, leaving no conventional legal remedy for the 
party being extorted).  
229. Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (noting that in cases involving statutes 
that regulate free expression, the “assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally 
assure ample vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded”). 
230. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (observing, in upholding the rights 
of a couple wishing to cover the New Hampshire state motto on their license plate, “[a] system 
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee 
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts”); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 
209, 234–35 (1977) (observing, in denying the use of union dues for political activities unrelated to 
collective bargaining, “[t]he fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than prohibited 
from making, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of their 
constitutional rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should 
be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind 
and his conscience rather than coerced by the State” (citations omitted)); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (observing, in overturning a requirement that students stay the 
pledge of allegiance, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are 
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us”). 
231. One may distinguish the case of the unwilling donor from the cases set out above by noting 
that his contribution is not required; it is (technically) a completely voluntary act. However, there is 
significant evidence, as outlined above, that many political contributors do not feel that they can say 
no and are giving (if they wished to give at all) far more than they would if they were giving just to 
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willingness of the donor impacts the qualities we may impute to the 
speech at issue and the attendant First Amendment protections.
232
 Even 
if one assumed such a right exists, however, it is not clear that the 
Constitution affords a remedy to an individual donor who feels obligated 
to make donations he would rather not make. 
Beyond the practical difficulties discussed above, an independent 
First Amendment claim would face a number of challenges. To highlight 
just some preliminary hurdles, courts are reluctant to recognize a private 
right of action where Congress has not provided one, and the Supreme 
                                                     
express support for the candidate and her positions. The law has recognized the coercive potential of 
a transaction in which one player has excessive market power and responded accordingly. See, e.g., 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (1965) (finding terms of adhesion 
contract unconscionable and unenforceable); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d 
(1981) (“[G]ross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the 
stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or 
compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did 
not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.”). But see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing contract of adhesion). See also Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012) (prohibiting anti-competitive business activities); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 12–27 (same); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 527 U.S. 28 (2006) (tying arrangement 
illegal under antitrust laws if plaintiff can show defendant had sufficient market power). It would be 
difficult to imagine that where a constitutional right is at stake, courts would not similarly 
acknowledge an individual interest in not being coerced into expressing, either in form or amount, 
something that one does not wish to express, and/or a government interest in creating a system free 
of such coercion. See O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 717 (1996) 
(finding private contractor stated cause of action under § 1983 when it alleged it was fired for 
refusing to contribute to mayor’s campaign: “[A]bsent some reasonably appropriate requirement, 
government may not make public employment subject to the express condition of political beliefs or 
prescribed expression”); Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 
296 (2007) (“Our cases teach that there is a difference of constitutional dimension between rules 
prohibiting appeals to the public at large . . . and rules prohibiting direct, personalized 
communication in a coercive setting.” (internal citation omitted)). 
232. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. While not framed as a free speech issue, it is 
worth noting that the Supreme Court and an en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit have both cited a 
concern that donors might feel coerced into giving in upholding, respectively, a bar rule prohibiting 
judicial candidates from soliciting campaign contributions and a federal law barring federal 
contractors from making any political contributions. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 
__,135 S. Ct. 1656, 1669 (2015) (“The identity of the solicitor matters, as anyone who has 
encountered a Girl Scout selling cookies outside a grocery store can attest. When the judicial 
candidate himself asks for money, the stakes are higher for all involved. . . . The solicited individual 
knows . . . that the solicitor might be in a position to singlehandedly make decisions of great weight: 
The same person who signed the fundraising letter might one day sign the judgment. This dynamic 
inevitably creates pressure for the recipient to comply, and it does so in a way that solicitation by a 
third party does not. Just as inevitably, the personal involvement of the candidate in the solicitation 
creates the public appearance that the candidate will remember who says yes, and who says no.”); 
Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Miller v. FEC, No. 15-
428, 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3550 (Oct. 2, 2014) (citing the risk that a contractor would feel 
coerced to make a contribution he would not otherwise make as a basis for upholding the contractor 
ban). 
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Court could well find that neither Section 1983 nor Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics
233
 and its 
progeny provide the unwilling donor a remedy.
234
 Further, under either 
theory an unwilling donor would have to demonstrate that a “state 
action” has caused his constitutional deprivation and, further still, that 
his claims are not barred by a defense of sovereign or qualified 
immunity.
235
 These problems would not necessarily doom the action, but 
they present significant obstacles.
236
 
It is unlikely that these details would ever trouble the unwilling donor, 
however, because there are far more substantial practical impediments to 
reaching the point of considering individual action. After all, the sine 
qua non of the unwilling donor is a reluctance to get on the wrong side 
of an elected official. It is difficult to imagine that donor willing to bite 
the hand that (potentially) feeds him, particularly in a competitive 
environment where he understands himself to be bidding for a 
politician’s favor or feels he cannot risk assuming otherwise. He is also 
unlikely to willingly court the kind of scandal that often accompanies 
public anti-corruption prosecutions by seeking help from the legal 
                                                     
233. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
234. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Bivens, 403 U.S. 388; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 
(2009) (assuming without deciding that a plaintiff could bring a First Amendment claim under 
Bivens); O’Hare Truck Serv., 518 U.S. at 717–19 (allowing private government contractor to 
maintain a First Amendment § 1983 action for retaliatory firing under political patronage scheme). 
But see Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66–70 (2001) (noting Court’s reluctance 
to extend Bivens, particularly where law provides alternative remedies); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 
367, 390 (1983) (declining to extend Bivens to First Amendment employee retaliation claim); 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (denying relief under § 1983 to private school 
plaintiffs). 
235. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838 (“The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is 
subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth 
Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights ‘fairly attributable to the State?’” (citation 
omitted)); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (government officials cannot be held vicariously liable under 
Bivens for actions of their subordinates); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998) (elected 
officials have absolute immunity for legislative actions); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) 
(“Whether an official may prevail in his qualified immunity defense depends upon the ‘objective 
reasonableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
236. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 298–302 (holding that certain private actors may be 
considered state actors for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a sufficiently close 
nexus); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (same in the context of a private political primary); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 506 (1985) (arguing that 
“limiting the Constitution’s protections of individual rights to state action is anachronistic, harmful 
to the most important personal liberties, completely unnecessary, and even detrimental to the very 
goals that it originally intended to accomplish”); cf. MCCHESNEY, supra note 30. Because my goal 
here is to frame the problem and consider its possible implications on campaign finance 
jurisprudence, I leave a more fulsome discussion of the First Amendment to a future piece. 
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system.
237
 Those wealthy donors who have spoken out about feeling 
“extorted” to make campaign contributions, such as John Hofmeister, 
quoted in the introduction, are mostly former executives who no longer 
feel the pressure to give in excess of or at odds with their true 
preferences.
238
 
Last, it is also difficult to imagine a federal elected official being so 
brazen in her request to cross the line into outright extortion, particularly 
as defined by the Supreme Court.
239
 As shown in the anecdote about 
former Representative DeLay above, politicians and donors with any 
degree of sophistication can have quite transactional discussions without 
demonstrating the requisite level of intent or motive.
240
 While there have 
been a few high-profile prosecutions under federal corruption laws over 
the last few decades, most politicians are able to solicit campaign funds 
within the boundaries of what the law allows; we have no way of 
knowing how many (if any) of their requests are viewed as extortionate. 
Consider too that both the federal anticorruption laws and campaign 
finance legislation were written by legislatures to constrain legislators. 
On the one hand, there is no one more familiar with the requirements 
and temptations of campaign fundraising; on the other hand, there is the 
risk of the fox guarding the henhouse.
241
 
                                                     
237. Consider, for example, the recent trial of former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell. See 
United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’g 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 
2014), petition for cert. filed, (Oct. 15, 2015) (No. 15-474) (holding there was sufficient evidence to 
support jury’s determination that defendant had accepted gifts and loans in exchange for his use of 
his official position); Dana Milbank, Opinion, Bob McDonnell Is a Loser Either Way, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-bob-mcdonnell-is-a-loser-
either-way/2014/08/04/49cd64c6-1c2f-11e4-ae54-0cfe1f974f8a_story.html (observing that “[e]ven 
if the disgraced former Virginia governor wins in court, he loses”). McDonnell’s conviction was 
affirmed on appeal, but the Supreme Court subsequently stayed the decision, suggesting that it 
might soon have more to say on issues discussed in this section. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, petition 
for stay granted, 136 S. Ct. 23 (2015), and petition for cert. filed, (Oct. 15, 2015) (No. 15-474). 
238. See Fitzpatrick & Griffin, supra note 26. 
239. Cf. SCHWEIZER, supra note 27, at 173 (“[T]here shouldn’t be style points when it comes to 
corruption.”). 
240. See ABRAMOFF, supra note 124, at 64–65. If anything, the Abramoff prosecution 
underscored this fact. His bribery and similar crimes were only discovered when Indian tribes 
complained that their lobbyist was over-charging them. Good, supra note 152, at 354–55. Indeed, 
when one considers recent corruption convictions, it is the indiscreetness of the culpable parties that 
is most remarkable. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 182, at 106–07 (showing notes from former 
Congressman Randy “Duke” Cunningham, who noted a price list for various bribes); SCHWEIZER, 
supra note 27, at 171 (quoting disgraced Gov. Rod Blagojevich as saying of President Obama’s 
vacant Senate seat, “you just don’t give it away for nothing”). 
241. See supra note 10 (noting that in late 2014 Congress quietly raised the amount that national 
party committees could solicit from less than $100,000 per cycle to more than $800,000); see also 
MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 47 (“[A] period during which tax reform is formulated can be 
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The discussion above demonstrates two things. First, the only place 
the unwilling donor is likely to find relief from the perceived coercion of 
the campaign finance system is within campaign finance laws 
themselves. After all, the very purpose of these laws is to target and limit 
improper political pressure—for example, the degree to which elected 
officials might feel pressured by a donor to take a certain action,
242
 the 
degree to which an employee may feel pressured by an employer to 
contribute,
243
 and the degree to which a federal contracting officer may 
feel pressured to award a contract.
244
 It is the proper arena in which to 
safeguard the interests of a donor who might feel pressured by a 
candidate or party official to contribute. Second, campaign finance must 
be understood as a systemic framework of reforms that may borrow 
from or overlap with individual anti-corruption laws but is not co-
terminal with them. 
To expand on the second point: The pressure that the unwilling donor 
feels—that he cannot say no without risking indirect or even direct 
repercussions—comes only in part from an elected official or her staff. It 
also comes from the knowledge that dozens or hundreds of other 
donors—perhaps some also unwillingly—are contributing to the same 
politicians (or to opposing politicians) in the hope that their issues will 
be prioritized. In the case of legislation for which there are deep-
pocketed interests on both sides—a “double milker” bill in the 
vernacular—the fundraising opportunities for elected officials are 
significant.
245
 Where the issue is less salient, there is still sufficient 
                                                     
particularly profitable for members of the tax-writing committees. Not surprisingly, the most 
influential members of those committees garner the most contributions . . . ‘the only reason it isn’t 
considered bribery is that Congress gets to define bribery.’” (quoting former Rep. Andrew Jacobs, 
Jr.)); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 2 (author unknown) (The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc.) (“In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself.”); TEACHOUT, supra note 166. While beyond the scope of this Article, I would note 
that the risk of self-dealing does not resolve the question of whether Congress’s judgments in this 
area should be more susceptible to judicial overrides. Cf. Rosen, supra note 99, at 1607–10 (arguing 
that even if the Court is justified in ignoring Congress and “going it alone” in the campaign finance 
area, it has failed to adequately make that case). 
242. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
243. 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2014) (a corporation cannot use “coercion, such as the threat of a 
detrimental job action, the threat of any other financial reprisal, or the threat of force, to urge any 
individual to make a contribution or engage in fundraising activities on behalf of a candidate or 
political committee”). 
244. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  
245. See SCHWEIZER, supra note 27, at 80–81 (“A milker bill gives politicians the opportunity to 
‘milk,’ or squeeze, an industry for money. Whether the bill passes or not, the politicians still cash 
in.”). 
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evidence that large contributors receive beneficial outcomes to make an 
informed donor believe that he must “pay to play.”246 
Because the pressure does not come solely from the individual elected 
official, a legal action against that official would only partially assuage 
the fears that motivate the unwilling donor. His concerns are born out of 
an understanding of the structural incentives embedded in campaign 
finance laws. The only way to change these is through structural reform. 
The next sections consider how the Court might incorporate the interests 
of the unwilling donor in its campaign finance jurisprudence. 
B. Acknowledging the Unwilling Donor in Campaign Finance 
Doctrine 
Thus far, we have seen that the problem of the unwilling donor 
complicates the Court’s emphasis on quid pro quo corruption and 
underscores the need for a comprehensive system of campaign finance 
regulation. There remains the question of how this flipped narrative 
might impact the framework for judicial review of campaign finance 
restrictions set out in Part I above. The unwilling donor has not yet made 
an appearance in major campaign finance litigation.
247
 What would it 
look like for the courts to acknowledge his interests? The goal of this 
Article is not to present a definitive framework, but we can draw some 
preliminary conclusions. 
First, the problem of the unwilling donor complicates the elision of 
money and speech that has dogged campaign finance discussions since 
Buckley. There, the Court had reasoned that “because virtually every 
means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the 
expenditure of money,” a “restriction on the amount of money a person 
or group can spend on political communication during a campaign 
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number 
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the 
audience reached.”248 This connection has been challenged in academic 
                                                     
246. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 29–32. 
247. He has, however, played a bit part in two recent decisions of note. See Williams-Yulee v. 
Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015); Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2015), 
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Miller v. FEC, No. 15-428, 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3550 
(Oct. 2, 2014). The interests of the unwilling donor were not squarely addressed in either case, 
however. In Williams-Yulee, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court treated his 
potential existence as evidence that solicitation by judicial candidates raises the appearance of 
impropriety. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1661. In Wagner, the D.C. Circuit treated it as a potential 
threat to a merits-based contracting system. Wagner, 739 F.3d at 13. 
248. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
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literature and even by some Justices in intervening decades, but it has 
remained at the heart of modern campaign finance doctrine.
249
 Indeed, as 
evidenced by shifts in the treatment of contributions between the 
Buckley and McCutcheon Courts, the money-speech connection has only 
grown stronger.
250
 The Court’s rationale is undermined, however, if the 
speech that is purchased with campaign contributions does not capture 
the true views of the donor or if it is not given with an electoral goal as 
its primary purpose—if it is, in effect, less about speech than about 
money.
251
 
Second, the problem of the unwilling donor is about more than the 
Government’s compelling interest in “corruption,” whether one is 
talking about the Supreme Court’s current narrow definition or its 
earlier, broader versions.
252
 A donor’s interest in not speaking and not 
associating in political contests beyond what he actually believes cuts to 
the constitutional core of campaign finance jurisprudence.
253
 It requires a 
more critical examination of the First Amendment concerns raised by 
campaign contributions. 
Academics have long debated the underlying purpose of the 
protections of the First Amendment, and the problem of the unwilling 
donor implicates many of these.
254
 As evidenced by the discussion of 
Buckley and McCutcheon above, there are at least two ways one might 
frame the problem: as concern for protecting core political speech, or as 
                                                     
249. See, e.g., supra note 35; see also Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 953 (2011); Jessica A. Levinson, The Original Sin of Campaign Finance Law: Why 
Buckley v. Valeo Is Wrong, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 881 (2013); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the 
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). 
250. See supra notes 55–57, 100–02 and accompanying text (describing how the McCutcheon 
plurality rejected Buckley’s conclusion that contribution caps restrict only certain forms of 
expression and thus are valid).  
251. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 96, at 425–26, 444 (arguing that “contributions and expenditures 
affect two audiences [voters and candidates] in two different ways, one of them beneficial and 
protected by the First Amendment and the other harmful and unprotected”). 
252. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. The longtime acceptance of an expansive 
definition of corruption may explain why the legal academics have thus far paid scant attention to 
alternative frameworks. 
253. See supra notes 230–36.  
254. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); POST, supra note 37; Thomas L. Ambro & Paul J. Safier, The First 
Amendment, the Courts, and “Picking Winners,” 87 WASH. L. REV. 397 (2012); Robert H. Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1971); William J. 
Brennan, III, Brennan on Brennan: The Justice’s Views on the Structural Role of the First 
Amendment, 1994 N.J. LAW. 6 (1994); Hellman, supra note 249; Zephyr Teachout, Constitutional 
Purpose and the Anti-Corruption Principle, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 200 (2014). 
12 - Mueller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:08 PM 
2015] THE UNWILLING DONOR 1839 
 
a concern for protecting the speaker.
255
 
First, if in fact the speech represented by the campaign contributions 
is coerced or given unwillingly, one may fairly question what level of 
constitutional protection it is due.
256
 Such contributions do not 
accurately reflect the donor’s true feelings, so applying the First 
Amendment to defend the speaker’s right to participate in “[d]iscussion 
of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates” seems 
misplaced.
257
 Nor do they provide the listener access to a reliable 
“free . . . uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate about the same to 
help her make an “informed choice” for advancement of “our 
democracy.”258 Relatedly, if in fact money is being given or solicited not 
to influence the outcome of an election, nor even to gain influence and 
access for the donor, but instead with the intent to procure a legislative 
result, it deserves no constitutional protection.
259
 
It is uncertain whether these concerns about the nature of the speech 
represented by unwilling contributions, even if validated, would be 
enough to impact current campaign finance doctrine. Notwithstanding 
the Court’s discussion of elevated status of political speech in Buckley 
and subsequent rulings, in recent years it has rejected arguments 
questioning the value of the speech protected by campaign finance laws, 
although these arguments have been framed as concerns about 
                                                     
255. See supra notes 66–75 and accompanying text. 
256. Cf. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 254; Bork, supra note 254 (opining that “[c]onstitutional 
protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political”). 
257. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); 
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (upholding anti-spam statute and noting 
“the right of every person ‘to be let alone’ must be placed in the scales with the right of others to 
communicate”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
258. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see 
also McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1480 (2014) (plurality opinion); Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (noting that the Founders “valued 
liberty both as an end and as a means . . . [and] believed that freedom to think as you will and to 
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth”). 
259. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441; Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
1323, 1323–24 (2000) (observing that “core vote buying” is illegal across the United States and 
evaluating normative rationales for this prohibition); Hellman, supra note 249, at 960–63 
(comparing alienable and inalienable constitutional privileges); cf. Robert Peck, Jamin B. Raskin & 
Burton D. Wechsler, Constitutional Implications of Campaign Finance Reform, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. 
U. 161, 186 (1995) (“If spending money in politics is really speech, then the laws against bribery 
should be unconstitutional. If what is being protected is my right to express myself by spending 
money, I should have the right to buy a legislator’s vote or a citizen’s vote. . . . If someone 
disagrees, that person can express views more eloquently by paying him more money than I am 
offering. But if we say that the purchase of votes offends the core principle of democracy, then I 
agree. But that is essentially the system we have now.” (quoting Professor Jamin Raskin)). 
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corruption rather than speech.
260
 Thus, for example, the Court has 
rejected the argument that evidence that political donors are motivated 
by a desire for undue “access” and “influence,” rather than by a desire to 
engage in political debate, demonstrates a sufficient risk of corruption or 
appearance of corruption to warrant campaign finance restrictions.
261
 
Under the framework proposed in this Article, however, evidence of 
contributions given for “access” and “influence” is not merely evidence 
of potential corruption or its appearance; rather, it demonstrates that the 
nature of the speech itself is compromised, and validates the concerns of 
the unwilling donor. Nevertheless, a reviewing court may find 
arguments based in the quality of the speech at issue foreclosed by the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in this area.262 
More difficult to reject under the Court’s current jurisprudence are 
concerns not about the nature of the speech at issue but about the actual 
intent of the speaker, that is, the autonomous interest of the donor in 
remaining silent.
263
 When framed thus, two things become clear. First, 
for reasons discussed above, these interests can only be addressed 
through systemic reforms; the unwilling donor is less a political 
enthusiast and more a risk-adverse strategist who will respond to the 
logic of the system with which he is presented.
264
 Second, campaign 
finance laws impact the rights of both the willing and the unwilling 
donor, both of whom have a First Amendment interest in the decision of 
whether, how much, and to whom to contribute. This Article argues that 
campaign finance jurisprudence should accommodate the interests of 
both types of donors. 
There are different ways a court might thread this needle. Although 
Buckley nowhere mentions the rights of non-association and non-
expression, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court’s suggestion there 
that a donor’s First Amendment interests in contributing are largely 
                                                     
260. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1453 (acknowledging that some speakers may be giving 
with “bad” intentions but finding that where the First Amendment is implicated the Court will not 
scrutinize too closely). 
261. See supra notes 69–85 and accompanying text. 
262. But see Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding a ban on 
direct solicitation by state judicial candidates because, inter alia, some donors may feel coerced by 
the request); Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed sub nom. 
Miller v. FEC, No. 15-428, 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3550 (Oct. 2, 2014) (upholding a ban on 
federal contractor contributions because, inter alia, some contractors may feel coerced to give). 
263. Cf. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687 (2004) 
(arguing that the structural provisions of the Constitution are often overlooked in favor of individual 
rights); see also supra notes 230–36 and accompanying text. 
264. See Chamon & Kaplan, supra note 131; Morehead, supra note 157. 
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associative and symbolic resulted in an outcome that did achieve 
something of a balance between the willing and unwilling donor. The 
Buckley Court said that because a political contribution does not convey 
a political argument beyond the expressive act of giving, Congress could 
limit the amount of the donation but not the act itself.
265
 Thus, in the pre-
McCutcheon world the unwilling donor might feel coerced into giving 
but could not be coerced into giving past a certain limit; the “arms race” 
had known, and manageable, boundaries. This approach also 
encapsulates the idea that as the amount of the contribution becomes 
higher, the expressive/associative interests of the willing donor diminish 
and the non-expressive/non-associative interests of the unwilling donor 
increase.
266
 A tie initially goes to the expressive interests, but at a certain 
point the non-expressive interests predominate. 
One line of analysis courts might take now is to recognize the 
interests of the unwilling donor as an additional “compelling” 
government justification for campaign finance restrictions. Under this 
approach, a court would ask both whether a restriction is justified 
because of the risk of actual or apparent corruption, as it currently does, 
and whether it is justified because of the risk that certain contributions 
might be coerced from donors who would prefer to not express or 
associate at the level to which they feel compelled. A right to speak is 
diminished if it does not also include a realistic opportunity to not 
speak.
267
 
Alternatively, recognizing that the current campaign finance system 
creates two categories of donors—willing and unwilling—suggests that 
a more fundamental overhaul of the traditional analysis may be 
warranted. A purposeful balancing of these interests would re-structure 
the test that courts currently use to evaluate campaign contributions.
268
 
                                                     
265. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976). The McCutcheon Court rejected this approach. 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449 (“To require one person to contribute at lower levels than others 
because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on broader 
participation in the democratic process.”). 
266. In this regard, the unwilling donor problem provides additional arguments against the 
Court’s increasingly “absolutist” approach to campaign finance restrictions. See, e.g., James A. 
Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied 
Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 673 (2011); Rosen, supra note 99. Whereas other 
scholars’ critiques propose balancing the threat to individual First Amendment interests against 
concerns such as “democratic ideals,” Gardner, supra, at 711, or “Republican Legitimacy,” Rosen, 
supra note 99, at 1608, the approach outlined above highlights the individual constitutional interests 
on both sides. 
267. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
268. Although the McCutcheon plurality indicated that it reached its result without deciding 
whether campaign contributions were subject to strict or “exacting” scrutiny, McCutcheon, 134 S. 
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Through the lens of the unwilling donor, a donor’s positive First 
Amendment expressive/associative interests become somewhat less than 
the Court currently suggests, and the Government’s interest in 
regulating—in setting rules of the game that protect both interests—
becomes greater. Thus, even if corruption or the appearance of 
corruption, however defined, continues to be the touchstone for 
determining whether regulation in an area is appropriate, the latitude 
permitted the Government to address this compelling interest would be 
greater. 
It is worth pausing to consider independent expenditures—money not 
subject to contribution limits and not raised by a candidate nor 
coordinated in any way with her campaign—and to question the 
soundness of an argument advocating for continued restrictions on 
campaign contributions despite the vast amount that has been spent 
independently on federal elections in recent years.
269
 Outside spending, 
not including political parties’ expenditures, topped $1 billion in the 
2012 cycle.
270
 
Far from undermining the argument of this Article, the existence of a 
robust independent expenditure system supports it. Provided that 
independent expenditures are truly independent—a significant caveat in 
the 2015–2016 cycle271—the problem of the unwilling donor should be 
less acute in the independent expenditure area.
272
 As described above, 
                                                     
Ct. at 1437, its articulation of the test, particularly its focus on narrow tailoring, suggests that 
scrutiny will be strict—or at least stricter—going forward. See supra note 91 and accompanying 
text. 
269. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010); 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a) (2014) 
(“The term independent expenditure means an expenditure by a person for a communication 
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not made in 
cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a 
candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.”). 
270. Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php (last visited Oct. 
9, 2015). 
271. Already there has been circumvention of the prohibition on coordination between super 
PACs and candidates. See, e.g., Russ Choma, DOJ Announces First Prosecution for Illegal 
Coordination Between Candidate and Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Feb. 12, 2015), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2015/02/dojs-announces-first-prosecution-for-illegal-
coordination-between-candidates-and-super-pacs/ (reporting on the recent conviction of a 
Republican campaign staffer who coordinated funds between a super PAC and a candidate’s 
campaign); see also Richard L. Hasen, Jeb the Destroyer, SLATE (Apr. 22, 2015, 3:01 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/04/jeb_bush_destroying_campaign_f
inance_rules_his_tactics_will_be_the_future.html (discussing how Jeb Bush and other presidential 
candidates used a loophole in campaign finance rules to actively fundraise unlimited donations for 
their SuperPACs prior to officially announcing their candidacy). 
272. My argument here is that if politicians and parties are in fact walled off from the 
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much of the pressure felt by donors is rooted in the solicitation by the 
candidate, and a concern that the candidate might track their donations 
against other contributors.
273
 In the past, some commentators have gone 
so far as to suggest making campaign contributions anonymous, a 
solution that poses several structural concerns and practical obstacles (a 
donor could always, for instance, simply reveal himself), but has the 
appeal of removing the potentially coercive nature of both the 
solicitation and the contribution.
274
 
Independent expenditures provide a similar degree of remove. Due to 
their independent status, politicians cannot directly solicit them.
275
 
                                                     
independent money system, but see infra note 274, the unwilling donor problem is significantly less 
urgent. This is not to say, however, that independent expenditures do not also pose an extortive risk. 
As Holman notes, independent expenditures are already being used as quite blatant bargaining chips 
on the Hill. See Holman, supra note 225, at 60 (citing David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent 
Weapon in Campaign Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/01/22/us/politics/22donate.html (quoting former FEC General Counsel Lawrence M. Noble 
describing a request from a lobbyist: “We have got a million we can spend advertising for you or 
against you—whichever one you want”). Notwithstanding the Court’s conclusion in Citizens United 
that “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption,” 
558 U.S. at 357, this appears to be exactly the kind of quid pro quo behavior—perhaps not bribery, 
but certainly extortion—that should concern the Court. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 
(describing quid pro quo corruption as exchanging acts for money). It may even be that an 
awareness of such dynamics motivated the McCutcheon plurality to even the playing field by 
allowing candidates and parties to solicit greater amounts in return. It is difficult to imagine how 
such an “arms race” is good for business or the political process, much less in keeping with the 
Founding Fathers’ vision, but that is another article. See generally TEACHOUT, supra note 166. 
273. Based on the dissent in McCutcheon and the recently expanded contribution limits and 
national party committee counts, a federal candidate can now ask a single donor for checks 
exceeding $5.1 million to support colleagues and state and national parties. See McCutcheon, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1473 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, 
Pub. L. No. 113-235, div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. 2130, 2772–73 (2014) (to be codified at 52 U.S.C. 
§ 30116). As of yet, there is no single “joint fundraising committee” that could accept a single check 
for $5.1 million, although joint fundraising committees have flourished since McCutcheon was 
decided. Michael Beckel, ‘Jumbo Joints’: How Big Will the Newest Political Animals Get?, CENTER 
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Apr. 22, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/ 
04/22/14612/jumbo-joints-how-big-will-newest-political-animals-get. 
274. See Ian Ayres, Disclosure Versus Anonymity in Campaign Finance, in DESIGNING 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000). But see Richard Briffault, 
Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 295–97 (2010) (arguing that anonymity 
may have more detrimental consequences than benefits and that reform of the campaign 
contribution disclosure system is a better alternative to replacing the system with anonymity). 
275. 11 C.F.R. § 110.9 (2014); id. § 100.16. The unwilling donor problem could be implicated by 
independent expenditures if the donor experiences direct pressure to give at a similar level. 
Notwithstanding prohibitions to the contrary, there is mounting evidence that candidates are 
sufficiently enmeshed with independent groups to make the risk of donor coercion a real concern. 
See supra note 271. Indeed, the largest problem with independent expenditures is that their 
independence is often in doubt. Stories abound of campaigns and independent organizations sharing 
vendors, office space, and occasionally even a marriage bed. Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem 
with Citizens United: Campaign Finance, Dark Money, and Shadow Parties, the Boden Lecture, 97 
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Politicians also do not control the timing of the expenditure. An 
independent expenditure is typically an advertisement, which takes time 
to create and place and typically is most effective if timed around an 
election or vote on a particular issue. This is far different from a check 
that can be handed over on the spot in response to a phone call timed 
around a particular legislative or regulatory event.
276
 Without the direct 
solicitation and immediate benefit to elected officials, the coercion 
experienced by an unwilling donor is lessened to what courts may well 
consider an acceptable level.
277
 
This may be cold comfort to the strategic donor who acts out of an 
awareness of structural rather than specific pressure. However, the 
increased use of “shadow money” organizations that allow donors to 
mask their identity suggests that such a donor also engages in a different 
cost-benefit analysis when it comes to independent expenditures.
278
 
Indeed, an independent expenditure that is subject to full disclosure may 
be of limited value to the donor.
279
 Corporations, for example, face 
“constraints, both legal and practical, that can easily dull their ardor to 
engage in political campaigning,” from concerns regarding their 
fiduciary duties to their shareholders to an interest in maintaining the 
value of their brand.
280
 In addition, some have questioned the value of 
independent expenditures to the candidates themselves; after all, it is the 
donor, not the candidate, who controls the message.
281
 In short, the 
                                                     
MARQ. L. REV. 903, 916–17 (2014). Stephen Colbert underscored this point by conducting a 
conference call with his campaign committee and the SuperPAC supporting him. Colbert Super 
PAC - Not Coordinating with Stephen Colbert, THE DAILY SHOW (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/3pwzi5/colbert-super-pac—-not-coordinating-with-stephen-
colbert; see also infra note 276. Although reality may belie the “independence” of such 
expenditures, that is, for present purposes, a conceptually different problem.  
276. But see supra notes 272, 275 (suggesting that a closer examination of the policy and practice 
of independent expenditures is warranted). 
277. This is not to say that the independent expenditure system does not pose its own problems of 
rational coercion for donors. See Tucker, supra note 131; supra note 272. 
278. See Mueller, supra note 99, at 113 (describing the rise and structure of “dark money” 
organizations); Potter & Morgan, supra note 66, at 463 (providing history of rule that provides that 
money funding independent expenditures need only be disclosed if it is explicitly given for use on a 
particular ad). 
279. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (upholding the disclosure 
requirements of independent expenditures and electioneering communications in BCRA); Epstein, 
supra note 172, at 656; see also Sarah Haan, The CEO and the Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Deregulation, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 274–77 (2015) (describing consumer backlash to corporate 
and executive political giving). 
280. Epstein, supra note 172, at 656; see also Haan, supra note 279. 
281. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365; FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 476 (2007); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976). This analysis may change if one considers the impact of 
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likelihood that a genuinely independent expenditure is made unwillingly 
and does not reflect the donor’s true intent is far less than attends a direct 
political contribution.
282
 
A similar distinction was noted in the wake of 1907’s Tillman Act. 
Commentators observed that the Act quite deliberately banned only 
direct contributions from corporations.
283
 Organizations that were 
sincerely motivated to support a candidate, through either independent 
expenditures or individual contributions channeled through managers in 
the form of increased compensation (or, in later years, corporate PACs), 
could still do so. Because these were more cumbersome means of 
support, however, there was less risk that a donor would feel coerced 
into giving. In the words of an observer at the time, the Act provided an 
“excuse for the inability to respond swiftly and fully to an extortive 
ultimatum” without dissuading true believers.284 
The existence of the unwilling donor complicates the assumptions 
undergirding current campaign finance doctrine and calls for a re-
examination of the First Amendment interests it protects. At a minimum, 
the unwilling donor suggests that the current “exacting scrutiny” test 
should be re-configured to more accurately weigh both donors’ and the 
government’s interests.285 As shown below, doing so would allow courts 
to answer what now seem to be difficult questions of “fit” or line-
drawing. 
C. Revisiting McCutcheon Through the Frame of the Unwilling 
Donor 
Moving on from general principles, this Article concludes by 
considering how acknowledging the existence and interests of the 
unwilling donor might have affected the Court’s analysis in 
McCutcheon. Given that the result of the case disappointed many donors 
                                                     
negative advertisements. 
282. There is, of course, still a question as to whether someone making independent expenditures 
is doing so to participate in the electoral process or to improperly influence a legislator, but this is a 
factual question that touches on the corruption justification, and for now the Court has answered it. 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 324. 
283. Sitkoff, supra note 31, at 1135–36. 
284. Id. at 1125; see also id. at 1138 (quoting a 1906 New York Times article, which observed that 
“[t]he [Act] will lessen a very mean and sordid practice of blackmail. The beneficiaries of 
(regulation) will still find methods of furnishing the sinews of war to the party that controls their 
favors, but the great number of corporations that have suffered extortion through weakness and 
cowardice will have their backbones stiffened, and parties will be put to it to fill their coffers by 
really voluntary contributions”). 
285. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1437 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
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who, in media interviews, sounded unexcited at the prospect of giving 
beyond the previous aggregate limit,
286
 it is perhaps surprising that both 
parties and most amici overlooked the problem of the unwilling donor.
287
 
This omission reflects how deeply ingrained the narrative of the special 
interest “rent-seeker” has become in campaign finance jurisprudence. 
Had the unwilling donor been raised, it is uncertain whether his dilemma 
would have changed the outcome of the case. It would, however, have 
shaped the plurality’s analysis. 
As an initial matter, an awareness of the unwilling donor would have 
provided an answer to the two questions that were asked during oral 
argument to which a plurality of the Court did not receive a satisfactory 
response. Those questions, again, were: (1) Why should we draw a line 
between the ninth candidate (who could receive $5200 in an election 
cycle) and the tenth (who, because of the aggregate cap, could not), and 
(2) How can the Government justify such tight limits on campaign 
contributions when the same donors can spend an unlimited amount to 
influence an election through independent expenditures?
288
 
Viewing the case through the frame of the unwilling donor problem 
enables one to propose answers to these questions. As to the question of 
line drawing, once one understands campaign finance as a structural 
reform that balances the First Amendment interests of two opposing 
classes of donors, the need to draw a line is self-evident. For any donor 
who wishes to give the full allowable amount to a tenth candidate, there 
is likely to be one who wishes not to and yet feels that he cannot risk 
saying no. As for where the line is drawn, as the Buckley Court noted, 
“Congress’ failure to engage in . . . fine tuning does not invalidate the 
legislation.”289 
                                                     
286. ASB Business Leaders Critical, supra note 21; see also Matea Gold & Tom Hamburger, In 
2016 Campaign, the Lament of the Not Quite Rich Enough, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-2016-campaign-the-lament-of-the-not-quite-rich-
enough/2015/03/24/f0a38b18-cdb4-11e4-8a46-b1dc9be5a8ff_story.html; Levitt, supra note 15 
(“[H]ere’s a striking side effect: More than a few high rollers have not yet noticed that they just got 
bumped outside the velvet rope.”). 
287. See Levitt, supra note 113. 
288. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451; McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at 46–47. I have 
rephrased them for the sake of clarity. 
289. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976) (“As the Court of Appeals observed, ‘[i]f it is 
satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, 
a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000.’” (citation omitted)). Under Buckley, of course, a 
separate answer might have drawn the distinction between the rights of association and of 
expression. Id. at 15, 22.The McCutcheon plurality was only able to invalidate the aggregate cap by 
assuming that each extra dollar contributed adds to the “intensity” of the association or expression. 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446–47; see also Rosen, supra note 99, at 1609–10 (considering and 
rejecting arguments that might justify the McCutcheon plurality’s willingness to supplant legislative 
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As to the contrast between campaign contributions and independent 
expenditures, the discussion above outlines how contributions have long 
been understood to carry with them greater coercive potential because of 
the nexus between the solicitation and the contribution; the transactional 
potential of the exchange is significant. In addition, the financial and 
professional advantages of “hard money” contributions (e.g., fundraising 
trips to exclusive resorts, party status earned by fundraising success, 
cash on hand) inures far more directly to a candidate’s benefit than an 
independent expenditure.
290
 The compulsion an unwilling donor may 
feel to give is lessened in the case of a truly independent expenditure. 
There is an additional point about independent expenditures that the 
McCutcheon plurality overlooked; namely, that they provide an outlet 
for the willing donor stymied by contribution caps, or an answer to the 
question “But what is lost if we balance the interests?” It is curious that 
the plurality did not engage this point. Although the plurality considered 
(and rejected) an argument that in lieu of contributing a donor’s 
associative interests could be met by volunteering to work for a 
campaign,
291
 it overlooked the parallel argument regarding a donor’s 
expressive interests—that any harm posed to a donor by an aggregate 
cap was minimal because he could still express himself freely through 
independent expenditures.
292
 Indeed, in other cases where litigants have 
alleged interference with their First Amendment rights, the Court has 
cited the fact that an alternative outlet existed to allow for the exercise of 
the rights in rejecting the challenge. For example, in Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation of Washington,
293
 the plaintiff challenged lobbying 
restrictions for 501(c)(3) organizations, claiming they ran afoul of the 
First Amendment’s protection of the right to petition the government. In 
concurring with the Court’s opinion rejecting the challenge, Justice 
Blackmun explained that because a charity can form a sister nonprofit as 
a 501(c)(4) organization that can lobby without constraint (which in fact 
many charities do), the restriction does not substantially burden First 
                                                     
judgments in this area). 
290. See supra notes 127, 190. 
291. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449 (“[P]ersonal volunteering is not a realistic alternative for 
those who wish to support a wide variety of candidates or causes.”). 
292. The McCutcheon plurality side-stepped this objection by defining the right at issue not as a 
right to contribute to candidates one supports, but as a right to contribute up to the base limit to 
every candidate one supports. Id. at 1449 (“To require one person to contribute at lower levels than 
others because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on 
broader participation in the democratic process.”); cf. Levitt, supra note 102. 
293. 461 U.S. 540 (1997). 
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Amendment rights.
294
 
Had the unwilling donor’s interests been raised in McCutcheon, it is 
also unlikely that the plurality could have so easily dismissed the 
government’s concerns about the solicitation risks inherent in allowing 
any federal candidate to request—and receive—millions of dollars from 
a single donor.
295
 The plurality simply noted that presently “the 
aggregate limits are not limited to any direct solicitation by an 
officeholder or candidate,”296 without acknowledging that raising the 
amount that could be solicited from a relatively modest $123,200 per 
two-year cycle to a sum approaching $4 million (and subsequently raised 
to $5.1 million) might well significantly alter the calculations that had 
informed the existing system.
297
 
Last, as discussed above, recognizing the unwilling donor would have 
demonstrated to the plurality the limits of its analytical framework for 
campaign finance cases. The unwilling donor faces pressures that are 
unlikely to be addressed by individual anti-corruption laws, so it is not 
enough to treat campaign finance as a prophylactic layer atop federal 
criminal statutes.
298
 Moreover, his interests in not being compelled to 
express and associate beyond his true beliefs are of a constitutional 
dimension. At the very least, this would suggest a broader approach to 
the tailoring question than the plurality applied. 
In short, the problem of the unwilling donor may well have given the 
McCutcheon plurality pause. At this point, however, the proverbial 
horses have fled. Both Republicans and Democrats have launched joint 
fundraising committees that can accept single checks in excess of the 
                                                     
294. Id. at 552–53. Of course, this case was decided without application of the exacting scrutiny 
that is the hallmark of campaign finance cases. As this Article proposes that that scrutiny be 
lessened, however, the analogy remains instructive. The majority’s reasoning in Taxation with 
Representation is also relevant to the problem of the unwilling donor. The majority rejected the 
plaintiff’s challenge on the grounds that to permit lobbying by a group with a double tax 
advantage—501(c)(3) organizations are tax-exempt and donations to them can be deducted by the 
donor—would be asking taxpayers to subsidize that activity. Id. at 549–50. The Court was thus 
attentive to the existence of the unwilling donor qua taxpayer, albeit in a situation in which the 
money paid is mandated rather than coerced. 
295. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1453. 
296. Id. at 1461. 
297. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1485 app.B (describing how Justice Breyer came to the original 
$3.6 million figure); Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and 
Lobby Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 80 Fed. Reg. 5750 (Feb. 3 2015). If one includes PACs, the 
number increases significantly. See supra note 15 (noting there are more than 7300 PACs, including 
more than 500 Leadership PACs). 
298. See supra note 206. 
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previous aggregate limit.
299
 Five months after the decision in 
McCutcheon was announced, The Washington Post reported that 310 
donors had already given $11.6 million more than they could have 
before the ruling.
300
 The article quoted one of these donors, who 
indicated he had fielded “incessant political solicitations” since the 
decision.
301
 “It used to be kind of nice to say, ‘I’m maxed out,’ but I 
really believe that people running for office need to have support,” he 
told the reporter.
302
 
The dominant narrative is alive and well. It remains to be seen 
whether any unwilling donors will emerge in future campaign finance 
challenges to press their case.
303
 If they do, they may find wisdom in the 
adage that politics makes strange bedfellows. History, it seems, has 
come full circle, and once again the interests of the millionaires and 
billionaires reluctant to make political contributions align with those of 
                                                     
299. Russ Choma, Super JFC Donors Emerge in Third Quarter, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 15, 
2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/10/super-jfc-donors-emerge-in-third-quarter/. 
300. Matea Gold, Wealthy Political Donors Seize on New Latitude to Give to Unlimited 
Candidates, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/wealthy-
political-donors-seize-on-new-latitude-to-give-to-unlimited-candidates/2014/09/01/d94aeefa-2f8c-
11e4-bb9b-997ae96fad33_story.html; see also Julie Bykowicz, Annie Linskey & Greg Giroux, 
Political Donors Hit Up for Cash Hours After Court Ruling, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 2, 2014, 9:00 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-03/political-donors-hit-up-for-cash-hours-
after-court-ruling. 
301. Gold, supra note 300. 
302. Id. 
303. While beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that a court could take judicial 
notice of the unwilling donor problem; indeed, this approach has been adopted by the Supreme 
Court in recent campaign finance cases. In Citizens United, for example, the Court raised certain 
questions sua sponte after the parties had already briefed the case, and although McCutcheon was 
decided based on a limited record, both the plurality and dissent engaged in hypothetical donor 
scenarios in their opinions, even going so far as to contemplate the problem of the willing, yet 
corrupt donor. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451 (2014) (plurality 
opinion); Citizens United v. FEC, 580 U.S. 310, 396–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra 
note 90 and accompanying text. It may be sufficient for the concern to be raised by an amici, as in 
the Court’s 2015 decision in Williams-Yulee, which upheld a state bar rule prohibiting judicial 
candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions. 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
Although the State’s brief focused on the risk of perceived judicial impartiality, some amici, 
including the Conference of Chief Justices, dwelt on the possibility that an individual who might 
appear before the judicial candidate in the future would feel coerced into making a contribution if 
directly solicited. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Conference of Chief Justices in Support of 
Respondents, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499). Writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice Roberts noted that “[t]his dynamic inevitably creates pressure for the recipient to comply.” 
Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1660. Nevertheless, taking the concerns of the unwilling donor into 
account after forty years of campaign finance jurisprudence ignoring him would be a substantial 
paradigm shift, and it would require assumptions that some courts may be unwilling to make. In 
order for a court to make a true assessment of the constitutional concerns in the balance, it would be 
preferable for actual unwilling donors to intervene in existing actions. 
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the campaign finance reformers who have long sought to limit their 
ability to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
With the aggregate caps lifted and the amounts that can be solicited 
on behalf of either party raised to $5.1 million for the 2015–2016 
election cycle,
304
 the problem of the unwilling donor is likely to become 
increasingly salient. Less certain is whether courts will take notice. Two 
lawsuits pursued in 2014 following the McCutcheon ruling might have 
been occasions for a court to consider—or an ambitious intervenor to 
raise—the problem of the unwilling donor. One, Wagner v. FEC,305 
challenged the ban on political contributions by federal contractors.
306
 
The second, Republican National Committee v. FEC,
307
 proposed 
allowing political parties to raise—and its officers and agents to solicit—
funds for independent expenditures.
308
 It appears, however, that any such 
argument will have to wait. A unanimous en banc panel in Wagner 
looked to existing doctrine to uphold the ban, and the parties agreed to 
dismiss Republican National Committee v. FEC in late 2014.
309
 It may 
not have to wait long, however. As this Article went to press, a petition 
for certiorari was pending before the Supreme Court in Wagner.
310
 In 
addition, a new challenge to the soft money ban was filed in August 
2015, and some observers believe the case is likely to make it to the 
Supreme Court.
311
 
The goal of this Article has been to bring to light a problem that has 
been too long overlooked in legal scholarship and to change the 
                                                     
304. See supra note 297. 
305. 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
306. Id. 
307. 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2010). 
308. Id. 
309. See id.; Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2015) petition for cert. filed sub nom. 
Miller v. FEC, No. 15-428, 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3550 (Oct. 2, 2014). 
310. See Wagner, 793 F.3d at 21. 
311. See Complaint, Republican Party of La. v. FEC, No. 15-cv-01241, 2015 WL 4965908 
(D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2015); Richard L. Hasen, Op-Ed: The McCain-Feingold Act May Doom Itself, 
NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202734808860/OpEd-The-
McCainFeingold-Act-May-Doom-Itself?slreturn=20151007011139 (“If the Republican Party of 
Louisiana is able to convince the courts this time that the three-judge court is the appropriate route 
to hear its soft-money challenge, then there’s a good chance the [Supreme Court] will . . . strike 
down what remains of [the soft-money ban].”); Republican Party of La. v. FEC, No. 15-cv-01241, 
2015 WL 7574753 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2015) (finding that plaintiffs have standing to present their 
claims to a three-judge court). 
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campaign finance narrative to better reflect the realities of the current 
system and the constitutional issues at stake. Acknowledging the 
unwilling donor helps resolve some persistent tensions in campaign 
finance cases and suggests that courts should modify the existing 
framework for reviewing campaign finance restrictions. Viewing 
campaign finance interactions through the eyes of the unwilling donor 
also complicates the Court’s current reliance on quid pro quo corruption 
and demonstrates the need to maintain campaign finance limitations as 
an intact system of structural reforms that cannot be replicated through 
reliance on individual criminal prohibitions. It is likely that in the 
coming election cycle new challenges to BCRA will provide 
opportunities for an unwilling donor to join forces with campaign 
finance advocates to advance together the interests of the few and the 
many.
312
 Now that McCutcheon has raised the stakes, perhaps he will do 
so. 
 
                                                     
312. See Donor Demographics, supra note 9 (noting that only 0.3% of the U.S. adult population 
contributed more than $200 in the 2013–2014 election cycle, and only 0.05% contributed more than 
$2600). 
